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This Article resolves confusion over the scope of the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act (FERA), which amends the False Claims Act (FCA), to clarify that it
covers fraud against the taxpayers even where committed by and against other
government contractors and subcontractors. I focus on a controversial retroactivity
clause applying FERA’s expanded liability language to pre-enactment conduct.
Ambiguity has led to inconsistent outcomes: some courts have ruled that FERA’s
new language applies to pre-enactment conduct while others have reached the
opposite result. Much of practical consequence rides on how we resolve this
ambiguity—the Department of Justice is currently investigating over a thousand
FCA cases, each of which carries the potential for treble damages. I lay out an
analytical solution by applying the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine
announced in Landgraf v. USI Film Products and conclude that Congress intended
the statute to operate retroactively.
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I. THE FRAUD ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT (FERA)
Private contractors perform a greater share of government functions than ever
before: from military operations and for-profit prisons to social services and
education.1 Privatization has been criticized on a number of grounds, however,
including the possible “democracy deficit” caused by outsourcing core government
functions,2 and systemic problems with accountability and oversight.3
Congressional hearings beginning in 2007, for example, revealed widespread fraud
in Iraq war contracting.4 The prominent role of private military contractors in Iraq
and Afghanistan has focused continued attention on questions of criminal and civil
accountability.5 In the most recent scandal, former employees of the private
security firm Blackwater (now “Xe”)6 have sued the company under the False
Claims Act (FCA), alleging fraudulent billing practices—including charging
taxpayers for strippers and prostitutes.7

1. See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 3
(2002) (“Private and market-style mechanisms are increasingly employed to provide what
government had taken as duties. . . . Decision makers in education, health care, social
services, and law constantly cross the boundaries between public and private, religious and
secular, profit and nonprofit.”).
2. See, e.g., PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY THE PRIVATIZATION
OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 1–6
(2007) (citing ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT (2004)).
3. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 990–95
(2005) (citing Halliburton’s no-bid contracts and overbilling for Iraq reconstruction and
abuses by private contractors at Abu Ghraib as examples of accountability problems in
outsourcing government functions); see also SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, WAR
PROFITEERING PREVENTION ACT OF 2007, S. REP. NO. 110-66, at 2 (2007) (“Over the past four
years, war profiteering has . . . plagued this nation during the engagement of U.S. forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States has devoted hundreds of billions of dollars to
military, relief, and reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, including more than
$50 billion to relief and reconstruction activities. Private contractors have been used to a
greater extent during these war-time activities than at any time in our history. . . . Inspectors
General overseeing the provision of goods and services in Iraq and Afghanistan have found
that billions of dollars spent in Iraq are unaccounted for and may have been lost to fraud or
other misconduct.”).
4. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 3, at 2; see also War
Profiteering and Other Contractor Crimes Committed Overseas: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of the Hon. Robert C. “Bobby” Scott, Chairman, Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security) (“On the fraud side, the Department of Justice
has ignored the False Claims Act cases by obtaining court orders sealing the cases. Most of
the cases filed regarding the war profiteering in Iraq have remained under seal.”).
5. See, e.g., Editorial, Privatized War, and Its Price, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010, at A16
(noting dismissal of charges against Blackwater agents who killed seventeen Iraqis). “There
are many reasons to oppose the privatization of war. Reliance on contractors allows the
government to work under the radar of public scrutiny.” Id.
6. Blackwater Changes Its Name to Xe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A10.
7. See Suit: Prostitute, Strippers Part of Blackwater Fraud, CNN (Feb. 12, 2010),
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The trillion-dollar stimulus package has magnified the risk of fraud against
taxpayer funds and led to calls for better oversight of government contractors.8
Congress responded by enacting the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009
(FERA),9 a statute designed to “increase accountability for the corporate and
mortgage frauds that have contributed to the recent economic collapse and [to] help
protect Americans from future frauds that exploit the economic assistance programs
intended to restore and rebuild our economy.”10 FERA strengthens preexisting
fraud statutes, creates a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,11 and authorizes
nearly $500 million for law enforcement.12 Section 4 of FERA amends the FCA, a
statute that allows both private parties and the government to recover taxpayer
money lost to fraud.13 The FCA is one of the government’s primary resources to
fight civil fraud against taxpayers.14

http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/12/blackwater.suit/index.html; Mark Mazzetti, 2 ExWorkers Accuse Blackwater Security Company of Defrauding the U.S. for Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, at A22. An FCA lawsuit was filed alleging that “top Blackwater
officials had engaged in a pattern of deception as they carried out government contracts in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and in Louisiana in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The lawsuit,
filed under the False Claims Act, also asserts that Blackwater officials turned a blind eye to
‘excessive and unjustified’ force against Iraqi civilians by several Blackwater guards.” Id.
8. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 437–38
(“In response to the economic crisis, the Federal Government has obligated and expended
more than $1 trillion in an effort to stabilize our banking system and rebuild our economy.
These funds are often dispensed through contracts with non-governmental entities, going to
general contractors and subcontractors working for the Government. Protecting these funds
from fraud and abuse must be among our highest priorities as we move forward with these
necessary actions.”); see also Michael Cooper, Few Cases of Fraud Involving Stimulus
Money Have Been Detected, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2009, at A13 (reporting on
fears among government officials that stimulus money will be targeted for fraud); Grant
McCool & Martha Graybrow, FBI Targets Fraud in TARP, Stimulus Fund, REUTERS, June 2,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5515MF20090602 (“The FBI
has been bracing for a wave of fraud and corruption cases stemming from the government’s
multitrillion-dollar effort to stimulate the economy and help ailing banks.”).
9. Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (May 20, 2009).
10. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 2.
11. See About the Commission, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION,
http://www.fcic.gov/about/ (explaining the goals and mandate of the Commission); see also
Stephen Labaton, A Panel Is Named to Examine Causes of the Economic Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2009, at B3 (describing creation of the Commission and its appointment of
members).
12. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 3–4.
13. See Part II for a more detailed discussion of FCA.
14. Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the Department of Justice to
Rein in Out-Of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1233, 1235 (2008) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5268); see also S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (“One of the most successful
tools for combating waste and abuse in Government spending has been the False Claims Act
(FCA), which is an extraordinary civil enforcement tool used to recover funds lost to fraud
and abuse.”).
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As I discuss in Part II, FERA “legislatively overrules” Allison Engine Co. v.
United States ex rel. Sanders15 and United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier
Corp.,16 which held that the FCA requires direct presentation of a false claim to the
government.17 Requiring “presentment”18 would make FCA cases much more
difficult to prove in the increasingly common scenario of fraud by one government
contractor against another rather than against the government directly.19 Totten and
Allison Engine had dulled the edge of a powerful anti-fraud weapon.20 FERA
sharpened it again by removing the presentment requirement.21
In Part II, I explain the textual ambiguity in section 4(f), which applies the
FERA amendments to conduct on or after the date of enactment. The problem is in
the ambiguous language of subsection 4(f)(1), which makes an exception for
FERA’s revisions to the confusing presentment language in 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(B). The revised § 3729(a)(1)(B) would apply to “all claims under the
False Claims Act that are pending on or after [June 7, 2008]”22—almost a year
before President Obama signed FERA into law and two days before the Supreme
Court’s Allison Engine decision. Retroactivity language of this sort departs from

15. 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008).
16. 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
17. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10–12 (explaining that the FERA amendments were intended
to overrule Totten and Allison Engine). I discuss Allison Engine and Totten in more detail in
Part II.
18. See Kevin M. Comeau, False Certification Claims in Light of Allison Engine and
False Claims Act Amendments Introduced in the 111th Congress, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 491, 492
(2009) (“Allison Engine clarified § 3729(a)(2)’s requirement that a claim be approved ‘by
the Government,’ and resolved a circuit split about the general scope of FCA liability under
this theory of recovery.”); see also Robert L. Vogel, Feature Comment: The 2009
Amendments to the FCA, GOV’T CONTRACTOR, Oct. 7, 2009, at ¶ 342 (“Totten and Allison
Engine made it much more difficult for the Government to prove liability under the FCA in
cases in which Government funds were passed down along a chain—e.g., first, from the
Government to an entity that administered a program, or to a prime contractor, and then to a
grantee or subcontractor who made claims for payment to the administrator of the program
or the prime contractor, respectively.”).
19. Vogel, supra note 18, at ¶ 342; see also S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10–11 (“The Totten
decision, like the Allison Engine decision, runs contrary to the clear language and
congressional intent of the FCA by exempting subcontractors who knowingly submit false
claims to general contractors and are paid with Government funds.”).
20. See Gerard E. Wimberly, Daniel T. Plunkett & Heather A. LaSalle, The Presentment
Requirement Under the False Claims Act, BRIEFING PAPERS, Nov. 2007, at 1–2 (positing that
a decline in FCA recoveries is due to the judicially imposed presentment requirement
coupled with “the use of intermediaries in procurement so that perpetrators of fraud are often
at the subcontract and consultant levels dealing with prime contractors or in-country entities
that are not the U.S. Government”).
21. See United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 87, 106 (D.D.C.
2009) (“FERA ‘legislatively overrules’ the holding of Allison Engine by amending the
language of § 3729(a)(2), replacing the words ‘to get’ with the word ‘material.’” (citing S.
REP. NO. 111-10)).
22. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(f), 123 Stat.
1617, 1625.
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the usual legislative practice of proscribing only future conduct.23 The phrase
“claims under the False Claims Act” causes further problems because it can signify
lawsuits brought under FCA or alternatively it can be interpreted to mean the
fraudulent claim for payment that triggers liability under FCA.24 As I explain
below, we should interpret claims to mean cases, causes of action, or lawsuits. If I
am right about this, then FERA governs lawsuits pending on or after June 7, 2008,
which means that FCA actions against subcontractors that would have been
dismissed under Allison Engine could now move forward. This would likely
implicate conduct that took place years before FERA’s enactment date.25 On the
other hand, we can adopt FCA’s special, statutory definition of claim, which means
“any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or
property and whether or not the United States has title to the money or property,
that . . . is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the United States.”26 If
claims takes the special statutory meaning, then FERA governs conduct on or after
June 7, 2008. As a consequence, this reading would dramatically reduce the
temporal scope of the FERA amendments.27 As I explain below, a number of courts
have mistakenly adopted the statutory definition of claims28 and have consequently
dismissed a number of pending FCA actions against contractors or
subcontractors.29

23. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 856 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that legislators typically intend statutes to govern only future
conduct).
24. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G) (West Supp. 2010) for the FCA liability
provisions. See also United States ex rel. Crennen v. Dell Mktg. L.P., Civil Action No. 0610546-PBS, 2010 WL 1713633 (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 2010) (“[T]he term ‘claims’ in the
retroactivity clause is a paragon of ambiguity. Does it mean ‘claims’ for payment pending on
the date of enactment or to ‘claims’ brought under the False Claims Act in cases pending on
that date? Not surprisingly, courts have split on the subject. Some have held that ‘claims’
means claims for payment as defined by the act. Others have held that ‘claims’ means the
cause of action arising under the FCA.” (citations omitted)).
25. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 667 F. Supp. 2d 747,
752 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (“[T]he ‘claims’ upon which this ‘case’ is based were paid in the late
1980s and early 1990s and were no longer pending on June 7, 2008.”); see also Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 945 (1997) (lawsuit first filed in
1989 based on alleged false claims occurring between 1982 and 1984).
26. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2).
27. I explain in Parts VI.A.2(a)–(b) that there are three problems with the technical
reading. First, it does not make sense to say that a claim (i.e., a request for payment) is made
“under the False Claims Act”; therefore the technical reading does not scan on the textual
level. Second, even if it did make sense to say this, claims appears throughout FCA in a nontechnical sense and thus provides little basis for reading the technical meaning into section
4(f)(1) of FERA. Third, there is scant evidence in the legislative history that Congress
intended only to capture conduct on or after June 7, 2008. See Part VI.A for a full analysis of
the text and legislative history of FERA.
28. See Part V.B for a discussion of the reasoning of the “no retroactivity” courts.
29. See, e.g., Allison Engine, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (“Neither the amendments to the
FCA set forth in the FERA nor the prior FCA include a definition of ‘case.’ Thus, a plain
reading of the retroactivity language reveals that the relevant change is applicable to ‘claims’
and not to ‘cases.’ The new FCA retroactivity clause is not applicable to the Defendants in
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While the power of Congress to override judicial rulings is well settled,30
statutes that implicate past conduct raise both constitutional and basic fairness
concerns.31 The Supreme Court addressed these concerns in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, the landmark case that announced modern retroactivity doctrine.32 Courts
have not applied the correct Landgraf analysis to FERA’s retroactivity provision
and have thus reached inconsistent results,33 with some courts applying the statute
this case.”).
30. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 226 (1995) (“When a new law
makes clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law in reviewing
judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted, and must alter the
outcome accordingly.” (citing United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103
(1801); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273–80 (1994))); see also Rivers v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 305 (1994) (“Congress may also decide to announce a
new rule that operates retroactively to govern the rights of parties whose rights would
otherwise be subject to the rule announced in the judicial decision.”); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 338
(1991) (“Congress frequently overrides or modifies statutory decisions by lower federal
courts as well as those by the Supreme Court.”). However, Congress cannot command an
Article III court to reopen a case that has been brought to final judgment. See Plaut, 514 U.S.
at 219; see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000) (“Congress cannot retroactively
command Article III courts to reopen final judgments.”). Some have criticized the Plaut line
of cases as violating separation-of-powers principles. See, e.g., Ira Bloom, Prisons,
Prisoners, and Pine Forests: Congress Breaches the Wall Separating Legislative from
Judicial Power, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 389, 390–91 (1998) (arguing that legislative overruling
threatens to undermine separation-of-powers and liberty principles).
31. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265 (“Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that
individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct
accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.”). See generally Debra
Lynn Bassett, In the Wake of Schooner Peggy: Deconstructing Legislative Retroactivity, 69
U. CIN. L. REV. 453, 454 (2001) (“A careful analysis of the Court’s [retroactivity] decisions
reveals a consistent approach to retroactive legislation—an approach ultimately based in
fundamental principles of fairness . . . .”); Michael J. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1822–26 (1985) (criticizing categorical condemnations of retroactivity
and arguing that all statutes are retroactive to some extent, and that retroactive laws are not
categorically unfair or inefficient); Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation,
61 TEX. L. REV. 425, 444 (1982) (“[R]etroactive laws affecting property, contracts, and
taxation are more often justifiable than might be thought . . . .”); Bryant Smith, Retroactive
Laws and Vested Rights, 6 TEX. L. REV. 409 (1928) (discussing historical and political factors
leading to anti-retroactivity bias); Daniel E. Troy, Toward a Definition and Critique of
Retroactivity, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1329 (2000) (arguing that retroactive laws are generally
without justification); Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory
Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1063 (2006) (“[T]raditional categories of public and private
rights might be used to [create a] coherent scheme for deciding when statutory retroactivity
is constitutional.”). The present Article is of limited scope: because my goal here is to
resolve FERA’s retroactivity problem under established legal doctrine, I do not enter the
broader theoretical debate concerning retroactivity, which I address in a separate work in
progress.
32. See Part III for a discussion of Landgraf, 511 U.S. 244.
33. Compare United States v. Aguillon, 628 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550–51 (D. Del. 2009)
(holding that FERA’s amendment to the FCA did not apply retroactively under the Supreme
Court’s Landgraf analysis because Congress did not explicitly provide for such retroactive
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retroactively,34 and others reaching the opposite conclusion.35 This pattern is
troubling for at least two reasons. First, courts that find no retroactive intent fail to
do justice to individual litigants, potentially dismissing otherwise valid suits.
Second, the inconsistency reinstates the legal confusion that FERA was meant to
resolve.36 My goal is to clarify this confusion by guiding courts through the thicket
of retroactivity analysis.
Part III discusses Landgraf v. USI Film Products, which created a two-step
inquiry to determine whether a new civil law37 may govern conduct prior to the
statute’s effective date.38 We first ask whether Congress clearly expressed
retroactive intent.39 If so, then the statute may be applied retroactively, barring a
violation of the Takings,40 Due Process,41 Contract, Ex Post Facto,42 or Bill of
effects), with United States ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 685 F.
Supp. 2d 129, 140 (D.D.C. 2010) (“FERA provided for § 3729(a)(1)(B)’s retroactive
application ‘to all claims under the False Claims Act . . . that are pending on or after’ June 7,
2008. Because this suit was pending on June 7, 2008, the amended provision applies here.”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
34. See Part V.A for a discussion of the decisions that have held FERA to be retroactive.
35. See Part V.B for a discussion of the decisions that have found FERA not to be
retroactive.
36. See S. REP. NO. 110-507, at 9 (2008). The Senate Report explains that the False
Claims Act Corrections Act of 2008, the precursor to section 4 of FERA, was intended to
clarify conflicting interpretations of the FCA, to provide an affirmative answer
to unresolved questions created over the years by litigation, and to bring the
FCA back into line with congressional intent. . . . These provisions will assist
practitioners, judges, and businesses across the country by providing clarity and
certainty to the FCA.
Id.
37. Congress is, of course, categorically barred from passing ex post facto criminal
laws. See infra note 42.
38. See Bassett, supra note 31, at 490 (“Landgraf set out a two-part structure for initial
retroactivity analysis.”).
39. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (“When a case implicates a
federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether
Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.”).
40. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 534 (1998) (holding that Coal Industry
Retiree Health Benefit Act would violate Takings Clause because it would have retroactively
imposed “liability on Eastern and the magnitude of that liability raise[s] substantial questions
of fairness”).
41. See id. at 549 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)
(disagreeing with the plurality’s holding that the Coal Act violated the Takings Clause but
that “[t]he case before us represents one of the rare instances where the Legislature has
exceeded the limits imposed by due process”); see also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
428 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1976) (applying general due process analysis and finding that the Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act’s requirement that the company provide benefits for a former
miner’s death was not arbitrary and irrational).
42. Allison Engine on remand held that applying the FCA would violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause because it is essentially punitive in nature. United States ex rel. Sanders v.
Allison Engine Co., 667 F. Supp. 2d 747, 758 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (“Retroactive application
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because Congress intended for the FCA to be punitive and
because FCA sanctions are punitive in purpose and effect.”). I disagree with this holding, but
address the question fully in a separate work in progress. In sum, though, the Ex Post Facto
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Attainder Clauses of the United States Constitution.43 If, on the other hand, there is
no express statement, we next ask whether applying the statute to past conduct
would have genuinely “retroactive effects.”44 To find an answer, we appeal to
“familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled
expectations”45 and ask “whether the new provision attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment.”46 In the absence of a clear
statement, a new law may not control a pending case where such an application
would have retroactive effects.47
In Part IV, I review Lindh v. Murphy,48 Martin v. Hadix,49 and Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer,50 which clarified that legislative history and
general statutory interpretation principles continue to be relevant to the clear
statement analysis. Part V discusses the rulings to date on FERA’s retroactivity.
Courts have split into “retroactivity” and “no retroactivity” camps and have either
reached the wrong result or have reached the right result but have not provided
adequate justification. Part VI supplies a retroactivity analysis of section 4(f)(1)
and concludes that Congress intended FERA to govern cases that were pending on
June 7, 2008. Claims is used as a synonym for cases throughout FCA, so there is no
reason to import the technical definition from FCA into section 4(f)(1) of FERA.51

Clause applies to criminal/punitive statutes and not civil/remedial ones, such as FERA
section 4. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 394 (1798) (“The restraint against making
any ex post facto laws was not considered, by the framers of the constitution, as extending to
prohibit the depriving a citizen even of a vested right to property; or the provision, ‘that
private property should not be taken for public use, without just compensation,’ was
unnecessary.” (emphasis in original)); see also Oliver P. Field, Ex Post Facto in the
Constitution, 20 MICH. L. REV. 315, 315 (1922) (“This doctrine of Calder v. Bull is so well
settled as to have become one of the commonplaces of American constitutional law.”).
43. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266 (noting that the Contracts, Takings, Bill of Attainder, Due
Process, and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution prohibit certain types
of retroactive legislation). As a general rule, however, the constitutional bars to retroactive
civil legislation are now quite mild. See id. at 267 (“The Constitution’s restrictions, of
course, are of limited scope. Absent a violation of one of those specific provisions, the
potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail
to give a statute its intended scope.”).
44. Id. at 280.
45. Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 358 (1999) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270); see
Bassett, supra note 31, at 497–98.
46. Martin, 527 U.S. at 357–58 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270).
47. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 693–94 (2004) (quoting Landgraf,
511 U.S. at 280).
48. 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
49. 527 U.S. 343 (1999).
50. 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
51. See Part VI.A for a discussion of the reasons to reject the technical definition as
controlling section 4(f)(1).
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II. FERA’S RETROACTIVITY PROVISION
The False Claims Act imposes civil liability for making a false or fraudulent
claim to obtain payment from the government.52 Both the Justice Department and
private parties (called “relators”) may initiate an FCA action.53 A qui tam54 suit
functions as a “private attorney general” action.55 The statute imposes civil
penalties of up to ten thousand dollars plus three times actual damages.56 If a
private suit, the relator retains up to thirty percent of the recovery.57 Between 1986
and 2009, taxpayers recovered more than $24 billion in FCA judgments—$2.4
billion in 2009 alone.58 In this Part, I explain the “subcontractor loophole” created
by the Supreme Court in Allison Engine and Totten. I then describe FERA’s
legislative closing of the loophole and the retroactivity problem that it creates.
Under the pre-FERA version of the FCA, two key provisions—§ 3729(a)(1)–
(2)—impose liability on (1) one who “knowingly presents, or causes to be
presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government or a member
of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval”59 and (2) one who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved
by the Government.”60 Recent FCA suits have involved the Medicare Part B
program61 and the defense industry.62 Where the defendant defrauds the

52. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G) (West Supp. 2010) for the range of conduct
proscribed by FCA; see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM:
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 5–19 (2009) (providing historical
background and summary of modern FCA).
53. Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public
Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 283–84
(2007).
54. “Qui tam” is short for the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso
in hac parte sequitur” meaning “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009).
55. Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure Under the
Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 23, 23 (1998)
(“In passing . . . [FCA] qui tam provisions, Congress intended to commission ‘private
attorneys general’ . . . .”).
56. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West Supp. 2010).
57. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
58. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $2.4 Billion in
False Claims Cases in Fiscal Year 2009; More Than $24 Billion Since 1986 (Nov. 19, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-civ-1253.html.
59. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006). Section 4(a) of FERA changed the wording of this
provision. See infra text accompanying notes 67–69.
60. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). Section 4(a) of FERA changed the wording of this
provision. See infra text accompanying notes 67–69.
61. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Jamison v. McKesson Corp., No. 2:08CV214-SADAS, 2009 WL 3176168, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 29, 2009) (FCA suit alleging that
“McKesson and MediNet caused the submission of false claims under Medicare Part B
because they knew that CSMS was a ‘sham’ Part B supplier that failed to meet supplier
standards.”).
62. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gale v. Raytheon Co., No. 05cv2264-MMA(LSP),
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government directly, liability under (a)(1)–(2) is straightforward. The fraudster
either “presented a claim to an officer or employee of the United States” under
(a)(1) or “ma[de] . . . a false record . . . to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or
approved by the Government,” thus satisfying (a)(2). As simple as this seems on
the surface, it is often not self-evident when money is “paid by the Government,”
and as a consequence it is not always obvious when FCA liability attaches.63 To see
why this matters, imagine that Boeing wins a large Pentagon contract for a new
fighter jet. Boeing then enters into a subcontract with AirCorp for a jet engine.
AirCorp in turn enters into a further subcontract with TechCo for an engine
component. After completing the project, AirCorp presents a fraudulently inflated
demand for payment to Boeing, conduct that would surely violate FCA if AirCorp
had presented the bill to the government directly. Is AirCorp defrauding the
“government” for FCA purposes if Boeing rather than the Pentagon writes the
check, even if the ultimate source of the funds is the government? To further
complicate matters, what if TechCo presents a false claim to AirCorp?
Federal courts have squarely addressed the Boeing-AirCorp-TechCo scenario.
United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp. involved false claims to Amtrak, a
government grantee.64 In Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders,
defense subcontractors presented false claims to government contractors farther up
the chain.65 The question was whether FCA liability required direct connection
between the defendant and the federal fisc. Totten and Allison Engine answered this
question in the affirmative: FCA liability would not attach unless subcontractors
presented their claim directly to the government or intended the fraud to be
“material to the Government’s decision to pay or approve the false claim.”66
Congress enacted section 4 of FERA, titled “Clarifications to the False Claims
Act to Reflect the Original Intent of the Law,” to close the subcontractor loophole
opened by Totten and Allison Engine67 by replacing (a)(2)’s problematic phrase “to
2009 WL 3378976, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009) (“Gale claims that by hiring an
unqualified building maintenance and janitorial services company, and then charging the
federal government at inflated rates for the services, Defendants are together guilty of
misappropriating taxpayer funds and needlessly and recklessly endangering navy
personnel.”).
63. This is in part because contractors and subcontractors perform so much government
work. See, e.g., Lindsey Nelson, Note, Mission Not Accomplished: Missing Billions in Iraq,
Enhanced Whistleblower Protections, and a Large Failure in a Small Step, 38 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 277, 280 (2008) (“Contractors are now performing an increasing amount of work that, in
the past, had been performed by government employees.” (citing U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-93SP, A CALL FOR STEWARDSHIP: ENHANCING THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ABILITY TO ADDRESS KEY FISCAL AND OTHER 21ST CENTURY
CHALLENGES (2007))); see also supra Part I.
64. 380 F.3d 488, 498 (2004) (“Making false records or statements to get a false claim
paid or approved by Amtrak is not making or using ‘a false record or statement to get a false
or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government’ [for purposes of § 3729(a)(2)
liability].” (emphasis in original)).
65. 553 U.S. 662, 666 (2008).
66. Id. at 665; Totten, 380 F.3d at 491.
67. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438 (“The
effectiveness of the FCA has recently been undermined by court decisions limiting the scope
of the law and allowing subcontractors and non-governmental entities to escape
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get . . . paid or approved by the government” with a materiality standard:
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement
material to a false or fraudulent claim.”68 FERA also removes the phrase “to an
officer or employee of the Government, or to a member of the Armed Forces,”
which clarifies that there is no presentment requirement in (a)(1).69 Drafts of
similar FCA amendments had been circulating in Congress since 2007,70 but the
financial crisis created the necessary impetus to pass FERA.71 The federal
government has committed over a trillion dollars of taxpayer money to the bailout
and stimulus packages.72 Much of this money is likely to be channeled through
subcontractors and other intermediaries.73
Commentators have noted FERA’s potential for increased FCA liability in light
of the federal stimulus package.74 I focus here on the controversy surrounding
FERA’s effective date provision, which reads:
responsibility for proven frauds. In order to respond to these decisions, certain provisions of
the FCA must be corrected and clarified in order to protect the Federal assistance and relief
funds expended in response to our current economic crisis.”); see also id. at 10–12
(discussing the impact of Allison Engine, Totten, and United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v.
Custer Battles, LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D. Va. 2006), on FCA liability for
subcontractors and grantees).
68. See United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 87, 106 (D.D.C.
2009) (“FERA ‘legislatively overrules’ the holding of Allison Engine by amending the
language of § 3729(a)(2), replacing the words ‘to get’ with the word ‘material.’”); see also
Robert T. Rhoad & Matthew T. Fornataro, A Gathering Storm: The New False Claims Act
Amendments and Their Impact on Healthcare Fraud Enforcement, HEALTH LAW., Aug. 2009,
at 14, 17 (“FERA has legislatively overruled the Supreme Court’s Allison Engine decision . .
. .”); S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12 (new FCA definition of “material” is “consistent with the
Supreme Court definition, as well as other courts interpreting the term as applied to the
FCA”).
69. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 11.
70. Prior to FERA, both the House and Senate had drafted amendments to the False
Claims Act. See False Claims Act Correction Act of 2009, H.R. 1788, 111th Cong.; see also
H.R. REP. NO. 111-97, at 2 (2009) (“This legislation is particularly relevant during this period
of increased reliance on private contractors to perform what have traditionally been viewed
as governmental functions.”); False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009, S. 458, 111th
Cong.; False Claims Act Correction Act of 2008, S. 2041, 110th Cong.; False Claims Act
Correction Act of 2007, H.R. 4854, 110th Cong. For a summary of the legislative history of
FERA, see Comeau, supra note 18, at 508–12. I discuss the earlier drafts of section 4 of
FERA in Part VI.
71. See Laura Laemmle-Weidenfeld & Michael J. Schaengold, Feature Comment: The
Impact of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 on the Civil False Claims Act,
GOV’T CONTRACTOR, July 8, 2009, at ¶ 224 (“The current financial crisis and the resulting
Government bailout initiatives also provided the momentum necessary for Congress to
revise the civil False Claims Act (FCA) through FERA’s § 4 . . . .”).
72. David Cho & Lori Montgomery, New Bailout May Top $1.5 Trillion, WASH. POST,
Feb. 10, 2009, at A1.
73. See supra note 8.
74. See, e.g., Gerard E. Wimberly, Daniel T. Plunkett & Laura C. Settlemyer, The
Presentment Requirement Under the False Claims Act: The Impact of Allison Engine & the
Fraud Enforcement & Recovery Act of 2009, BRIEFING PAPERS, Aug. 2009, at 11 (“The sheer
number of potential parties to FCA liability has already increased with the passage of the
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(f) EFFECTIVE DATE AND APPLICATION.—The amendments made by
this section shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act [May
20, 2009] and shall apply to conduct on or after the date of enactment,
except that—
(1) subparagraph (B) of section 3729(a)(1) of title 31, United
States Code, as added by subsection (a)(1), shall take effect as
if enacted on June 7, 2008, and apply to all claims under the
False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq.) that are pending on
or after that date; and
(2) section 3731(b) of title 31, as amended by subsection (b);
section 3733, of title 31, as amended by subsection (c); and
section 3732 of title 31, as amended by subsection (e); shall
apply to cases pending on the date of enactment.75
To understand the problem, take each provision separately. Section 4(f) states that
FERA’s amendments to FCA apply only to future conduct.76 This is
straightforward: statutes typically operate prospectively. However, it is followed by
two subsections whose meaning is not immediately apparent. The problematic
provision—section 4(f)(1)77—carves out an exception for the amendments to §
3729(a)(1)(B), the provision eliminating the presentment requirement. Section
3729(a)(1)(B) applies to “all claims under the False Claims Act . . . that are
pending on or after [June 7, 2008].” Some courts have held—correctly78—that “all
claims under the False Claims Act” refers to all FCA cases that were pending on or
after June 7, 2008.79 On this reading, claims means lawsuits. Other courts have held

economic stimulus bills. Now, with the FERA amendments in place that broaden the scope
of liability under the FCA, the potential exists for almost any business or company to be
liable under the FCA. Combining that possibility with the other FERA amendments that
provide for expanded protection available to whistleblowers and qui tam relators, the
potential is great for a flood of FCA litigation.”).
75. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(f), 123 Stat.
1617, 1625 (emphasis added).
76. Note that this provision applies only to the amendments to FCA (“[t]he amendments
made by this section”). Id. (emphasis added). The statute does not include effective date
language for the remainder of FERA.
77. Subsection (f)(2) applies to several procedural and jurisdictional sections of FCA: §
3731(b) covers government intervention in a privately filed FCA case; § 3733 modifies the
procedures for the government to institute FCA actions; and § 3732 modifies the rules for
service of the FCA complaint on state and local governments. There have been no challenges
to section 4(f)(2), although I should point out that it is retroactive in the sense that its new
procedural rules will govern cases filed prior to May 20, 2009.
78. It is my contention that this reading of section 4(f)(1) is a natural fit with the text of
FCA (which uses claims generically to refer to lawsuits and causes of action) and better
comports with the “restorative” purpose of FERA. Several circuit and district courts have
adopted this reading of claims, although these rulings lack thorough reasoning. See Part VI
for my analysis of why we should read section 4(f)(1) as referring to cases.
79. See Parts V.A–B for a discussion of the district and circuit courts that have reached
this conclusion.
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that claims refers to the special statutory definition of “claim.” 80 As noted above,
the choice between these two meanings is highly consequential.81 According to the
Department of Justice, as of September 30, 2009, there was a backlog of nearly
1000 FCA cases under investigation.82 Many of these are likely to involve claims
against subcontractors, grantees, or other intermediaries, so the scope of
subcontractor liability is a pressing concern. Under any reading of claims, however,
section 4(f)(1) purports to regulate pre-enactment conduct and thus raises the red
flag of legislative retroactivity.83 Commentators have noted FERA’s retroactivity
issue,84 but no scholar has yet analyzed section 4(f)(1)’s proper scope and
operation. Because retroactivity analysis is grounded in the Supreme Court’s
landmark85 retroactivity decision, Landgraf v. USI Film Products, I turn to that case
in Part III.
III. RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS UNDER LANDGRAF V. USI FILM PRODUCTS
As I explained in Part II, FERA closed the presentment loophole by altering key
FCA language, which it then applied retroactively to “claims under the False
Claims Act . . . pending on [June 7, 2008].” Congress intended to overrule Allison
Engine and other decisions that had required presentment or specific intent to
defraud the government. Parts III and IV lay out the doctrinal roadmap for
retroactivity analysis grounded in a line of cases beginning with Landgraf v. USI
Film Products.

80. See United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 747
(S.D. Ohio 2009); United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C.
2009); United States v. Aguillon, 628 F. Supp. 2d 542 (D. Del. 2009).
81. See supra Part I.
82. FRAUD STATISTICS, CIVIL DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 9, available at
http://www.justice.gov/civil/frauds/fcastats.pdf; see also Rich, supra note 14, at 1241–42
(noting that FCA actions must remain under seal for sixty days, although the government can
request extensions, which are “routinely granted” and that qui tam actions often remain
sealed for up to two years).
83. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1993) (“[S]tatutory
retroactivity has long been disfavored . . . .”).
84. See, e.g., Kashmira Makwana & Peter M. Smith, “To Be or Not To Be
(Retroactive)”—That Is the FERA Question, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Jan.–Feb. 2010,
at 47 (summarizing FERA retroactivity rulings and evaluating the impact for corporate
compliance officers); see also Christopher C. Burris, Michael E. Paulhus & Louisa B.
Childs, Converging Events Signal a Changing Landscape in False Claims Act and WhistleBlower Litigation and Investigations, FED. LAW., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 59, 61 (“The
application of FERA’s revisions to the FCA’s substantive liability provisions is . . . complex.
. . . Confusion already has arisen as to how courts should interpret this provision.”).
85. See Vashti D. Van Wyke, Comment, Retroactivity and Immigrant Crimes Since St.
Cyr: Emerging Signs of Judicial Restraint, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 756 (2006) (“In Landgraf
v. USI Film Products, the Supreme Court provided the modern framework for analysis of
retroactivity questions in the civil context.”).
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A. Retroactivity and Negative Implication
The starting point for modern retroactivity analysis is Landgraf v. USI Film
Products.86 Barbara Landgraf sued for constructive discharge in 1989 under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.87 While her appeal was pending, President
Bush signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991.88 Among other things, the 1991
Act provided compensatory and punitive damages, where the 1964 Act had only
allowed equitable relief, such as reinstatement and back pay.89 Landgraf asked for a
jury trial on damages under the 1991 Act.90 It was not clear whether Congress
intended the new language to apply to pending Title VII cases, so Landgraf relied
on the canon of “negative implication” to argue that retroactive intent was
evidenced by several provisions read in tandem.91 Negative implication is a canon
of interpretation that “depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or
things that should be understood to go hand in hand, which [is] abridged in
circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term left out must have been
meant to be excluded.”92 The canon applies only “when the items expressed are
members of an ‘associated group or series,’ justifying the inference that items not
mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.”93 Two or more
sections covering the same subject matter and drafted at the same point in the
legislative process may reasonably be interpreted as if they expressed a unified
intent.94 The negative inference relies on the “rule against surplusage,” which
disfavors readings that render legislative provisions nugatory and assumes that each
word has a specific, intended purpose within the whole statutory scheme.95

86. See id.
87. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 248.
88. Id. at 249.
89. Id. at 252–54.
90. See id. at 249.
91. See id. at 258–61.
92. Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (alteration in original)
(quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002)); see also WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 255 (2000) (“[Negative implication] is close cousin to the hoary canon,
inclusio [expressio] unius est exclusio alterius . . . [a] rule of thumb [that] rests on the
supposition that directives normally allow what they don’t prohibit.” (second alteration in
original)).
93. Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 168.
94. See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 356 (1998) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.
320, 329 (1997)) (observing that the negative implication in Lindh had special force because
the relevant provisions of the AEDPA covered the same subject matter); see also Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 579 (2006) (noting that where the relevant provisions had been
“considered . . . together at every stage,” negative inference was strong); Field v. Mans, 516
U.S. 59, 75 (1995) (“The more apparently deliberate the contrast, the stronger the inference,
as applied, for example, to contrasting statutory sections originally enacted simultaneously in
relevant respects.”).
95. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“A statute should be construed so that
effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant . . . .” (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
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Landgraf began her inquiry with section 402(a), which reads: “Except as
otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act
shall take effect upon enactment.”96 Notice that this sentence has two clauses (in
italics). The main clause (“this Act . . . shall take effect upon enactment”) tells us
that the Act becomes operative on the enactment date.97 However, this clause is
preceded by a subordinate clause (“except as otherwise provided”), which modifies
the main clause and leaves us with a general rule (“takes effect upon enactment”)
followed by an indication that some of the statute’s provisions follow a different
rule.98 Thus, because the effective date language includes the caveat “except as
otherwise provided,” there must be at least two effective date rules. Rule 1 tells us
that the amendments take effect upon enactment (although it does not tell us what
“take effect” means). Rule 2 tells us that there is at least one exception to Rule 1’s
“take effect upon enactment” somewhere in the statute. This is so because the “rule
against surplusage” tells us that Congress would not have included the Rule 2
exception unless it meant to. So we should read the sentence to say, “The statute
generally takes effect upon enactment, although some provisions do not take effect
upon enactment and where this is the case we say so specifically.”
This line of reasoning has intuitive appeal. If a teacher says to her students
“some of you may leave early today,” we would take that to mean that some
students may leave early while some others may not. And so it is, mutatis mutandis,
with the language of the 1991 Act. After all, why would some provisions of the Act
take effect upon enactment if some other provisions did not? But even if this is all

CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (rev. 6th ed. 2000))); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200,
208 (1993) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (alteration in original) (quoting Russello
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 92, at 266
(“[E]very statutory term adds something to a law’s regulatory impact.”).
The negative inference concept is not without its critics. See, e.g., id. at 255
(“[I]nclusio unius is . . . an unreliable canon, and the reasons for its unreliability apply to
other negative implication canons as well.”). It has also been rejected or criticized in specific
cases where there are other plausible inferences from those sought by a litigant. See, e.g.,
Lindh, 521 U.S. at 337–41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (listing several possible inferences,
noting that “[n]one of these competing inferences is clearly superior to the others,” and
arguing that under Landgraf’s exceptions for procedural/jurisdictional statutes, it would not
be “retroactive” to apply AEDPA to pending case); see also Hadix, 527 U.S. at 356
(rejecting negative implication where relevant provisions covered different subject matter).
96. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 257 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 402(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1099).
97. As clear as this may seem at first blush, I note a potential ambiguity even here. After
all, “take effect upon enactment” might very well mean that the statute should be applied to
pending cases. This is so because it is not self-evident that “take effect” by definition
excludes pending cases. If so, this would simply raise the same Landgraf question under a
different guise. FERA gets around this problem by stipulating that “take effect” means
“apply to conduct on or after the date of enactment.” See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(f), 123 Stat. 1617, 1625.
98. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 258 (“[Landgraf] contends that the introductory clause of §
402(a) would be superfluous unless it refers to §§ 402(b) and 109(c), which provide for
prospective application in limited contexts.”).
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true, it does not help us identify the exceptions. Two provisions were natural
choices because they contained different effective language from the default rule:
[§ 109(c)] The amendments made by this section shall not apply with
respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of this
Act.
[§ 402(b)] Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in
this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint
was filed before March 1, 1975 . . . .99
These provisions specify that certain sections of the Act are not retroactive.
Now, if these are the only two exceptions to the default rule, and they are
exceptions because they stipulate certain sections not to be retroactive, then the
default rule must implicitly authorize retroactivity. In other words, why would
Congress have gone to the trouble of specifying that certain narrow provisions did
not apply retroactively if in fact all the provisions in the statute were not
retroactive? Because the statute identifies provisions that are not to apply
retroactively, it follows that “take effect upon enactment” in the default provision
must mean that the statute generally governs pending cases. If it were otherwise,
statutory language would be superfluous.
This line of reasoning did not persuade the majority. For one thing, plaintiff had
freighted two “minor and narrow provisions” with the burden of her entire
argument.100 Also, legislative history contained ample evidence of other possible
inferences. For example, the fact that an earlier version of the bill contained an
explicit retroactivity provision that President Bush cited as a reason for vetoing it,
while the enacted version did not contain that provision, made it likely that
Congress could not reach consensus on the retroactivity issue.101 Because
retroactivity doctrine prior to Landgraf was unsettled, Congress may have left it to
the courts to determine the temporal reach of the statute.102 Legislative history only
confirmed that no general agreement had been reached about retroactivity.103
Although some statements in the legislative history appeared to support Landgraf’s

99. Id. (quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 109(c), 402(b),
105 Stat. 1071, 1078, 1099).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 255–56 (“[I]t seems likely that one of the compromises that made it possible to
enact the 1991 version was an agreement not to include the kind of explicit retroactivity
command found in the 1990 bill.”).
102. Id. at 261 (“Congressional doubt concerning judicial retroactivity doctrine, coupled
with the likelihood that the routine ‘take effect upon enactment’ language would require
courts to fall back upon that doctrine, provide a plausible explanation for both §§ 402(b) and
109(c) that makes neither provision redundant.”).
103. Id. at 262 (“The 1991 bill as originally introduced in the House contained explicit
retroactivity provisions similar to those found in the 1990 bill. However, the Senate
substitute that was agreed upon omitted those explicit retroactivity provisions. The
legislative history discloses some frankly partisan statements about the meaning of the final
effective date language, but those statements cannot plausibly be read as reflecting any
general agreement.”).
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theory, the Court discounted these as “frankly partisan.”104 Because the
retroactivity language had been a point of contention in the earlier version of the
1991 Act,
[t]he absence of comparable language in the 1991 Act cannot
realistically be attributed to oversight or to unawareness of the
retroactivity issue. Rather, it seems likely that one of the compromises
that made it possible to enact the 1991 version was an agreement not to
include the kind of explicit retroactivity command found in the 1990
bill.105
It was reasonable to conclude that Congress left the contentious retroactivity issue
to the courts.
B. Landgraf’s Presumption Against Retroactivity
Neither plain language nor negative implication resolved the retroactivity
problem. Thus, the Court invoked statutory interpretation principles, which
revealed two competing retroactivity theories.106 On the one hand, Thorpe v.
Housing Authority107 and Bradley v. School Board108 held that “a court is to apply
the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.”109 In other words, a new law
governs pending cases and is thus presumptively retroactive. On the other hand, a
more recent line of cases beginning with Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hospital110 and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno111 held to the
contrary that “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law . . . [and] congressional
enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect
unless their language requires this result.”112 Faced with these contrary theories, the
Court opted for a presumption against retroactivity.113 Apparently not willing to
overrule the Bradley-Thorpe line of cases outright, the Court carved out four
exceptions where “application of new statutes passed after the events in suit is
unquestionably proper”114 even in the absence of a clear statement: (1) statutes

104. Id.
105. Id. at 256.
106. Id. at 264.
107. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
108. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
109. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 264 (quoting Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711).
110. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
111. 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
112. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 264 (quoting Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208) (internal punctuation
omitted).
113. See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208 (“Retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus,
congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive
effect unless their language requires this result.”); see also Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 840–58
(Scalia, J., concurring) (providing a history of retroactivity doctrine and concluding that
“[t]he presumption of nonretroactivity, in short, gives effect to enduring notions of what is
fair, and thus accords with what legislators almost always intend”).
114. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273.
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affecting only prospective relief are not “retroactive”;115 (2) courts “regularly
appl[y] intervening statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not
jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was
filed”;116 (3) a new procedural rule may control a pending case without retroactivity
issues;117 (4) new attorney’s fees statutes, which are “collateral to” and “separable
from the [main] cause of action to be proved at trial.”118 These situations do not
raise retroactivity concerns.
With the contrary line of authorities neutralized, the Court was ready to apply its
new retroactivity theory. Where a statute implicates past conduct, we follow a twostep analysis.119 First, we determine if Congress has “expressly prescribed the
statute’s proper reach.”120 The purpose of this “clear statement rule” is to ensure
that Congress has considered the potential unfairness of retroactive operation.121 If
the language is clear, then we apply the statute as intended, barring a violation of
the United States Constitution.122 If there is no express language, the analysis
moves to a second step and asks whether applying the statute to a pending case
would have genuinely “retroactive effects.”123 There is no clear test to determine

115. Id. at 273 (citing Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184 (1921)).
116. Id. at 274 (citing Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 116–17 (1952)).
117. Id. at 275 (citing Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 71 (1949)).
118. Id. at 276–77 (quoting White v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982)).
The attorney’s fees exception accounted for Bradley. As for Thorpe, the Court treats it as an
exceptional case involving an important constitutional right. Id. at 276. Thorpe seemed to
combine aspects of “procedure” and “prospective relief” cases. Id. Thorpe also comports
with the principle that the government should extend a grace period. Id. at 276 n.30.
119. See id. at 280. Courts have added an extra step when interpreting an agency rule.
See, e.g., Durable Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 578 F.3d 497, 503 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“When . . . an administrative rule is at issue, the inquiry is two-fold: whether Congress has
expressly conferred power on the agency to promulgate rules with retroactive effect and, if
so, whether the agency clearly intended for the rule to have retroactive effect.” (citing
Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208; Clay v. Johnson, 264 F.3d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 2001))).
120. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280 (“When a case implicates a federal statute enacted
after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly
prescribed the statute’s proper reach.”). See Part VI.A for a discussion of the clear statement
standard as applied to FERA’s retroactivity provision.
121. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268 (“[A] requirement that Congress first make its
intention clear helps ensure that Congress itself has determined that the benefits of
retroactivity outweigh the potential for disruption or unfairness.”); see also id. at 272–73
(“Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the
potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to
pay for the countervailing benefits.”).
122. See id. at 266 (noting that the Contracts, Takings, Bill of Attainder, Due Process, and
Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution prohibit certain types of retroactive
legislation); see also id. at 267 (“The Constitution’s restrictions, of course, are of limited
scope. Absent a violation of one of those specific provisions, the potential unfairness of
retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its
intended scope.”).
123. Id. at 280. “[R]etroactive effect” inquiry asks whether the statute “would impair
rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or
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“retroactive effect,” which is a practical inquiry requiring a “functional judgment
about ‘whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events
completed before its enactment.’”124 Landgraf laid out the following general
principles to guide our inquiry: (1) we should ask whether a statute “would impair
rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct,
or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed”;125 (2) we
should be guided by “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and
settled expectations”;126 and (3) we should consider “the nature and extent of the
change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new
rule and a relevant past event.”127 It is important to note that a statute is not
“retroactive” merely because it implicates pre-enactment events.128 A statute is only
“retroactive” if it implicates past events in a way that a court deems to be especially
unfair or inequitable.129
The 1991 Act contained no clear statement, so the inquiry moved to the second
stage to determine whether remanding Landgraf’s case for a new trial on punitive
and compensatory damages would have a retroactive effect.130 The punitive
damages provision, section 102(b)(1), created retroactivity concerns because
exemplary and punitive damages are like criminal sanctions, and thus raise
problems under the ex post facto clause.131 But even the compensatory damages
provision, section 102(a)(1), was impermissibly retroactive because it provided
damages where there were none before.132 Thus, Landgraf could not avail herself of
the damages provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.133

impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would
operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear
congressional intent favoring such a result.” Id.
124. Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 357–58 (1999) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270);
see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265 (“Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that
individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct
accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.”); Bassett, supra note 31, at
506–07 (stating that retroactive effect analysis applies “principles of fairness encompassing a
wide range of considerations, including equity, justice, and reliance”).
125. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.
126. Id. at 270; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001) (“[T]he judgment
whether a particular statute acts retroactively ‘should be informed and guided by familiar
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.’” (quoting Hadix,
527 U.S. at 358) (additional internal quotation marks omitted)).
127. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270; see also Princess Cruises v. United States, 397 F.3d
1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (combining Landgraf factors three and four into a three-part
retroactivity inquiry).
128. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269–70.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 280–82.
131. Id. at 281.
132. Id. at 282–83.
133. Id. at 286. Although agreeing with the result, Justice Scalia criticized the majority
for indulging in the “soft science” of legislative history, which risked turning Landgraf’s
“clear statement” rule into a “discernible legislative intent” rule. Id. at 287 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT MODIFIES THE LANDGRAF DOCTRINE
A line of Supreme Court decisions developed the Landgraf doctrine, reinforcing
the clear statement rule in theory, but modifying it in practice. As Justice Scalia
feared, the clear statement rule has softened into a “discernible legislative intent”
standard.134 The most important Landgraf case from the 1990s, Lindh v. Murphy,
involved the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA).135 Defendant was convicted for murder and filed a losing habeas appeal
with the district court. While his appeal was pending, Congress passed the AEDPA,
which amended the statute governing petitioner’s habeas claim136 and made habeas
arguments more difficult to win by requiring the state court decision to be “contrary
to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law.”137 Lindh argued that the new, more onerous standard should not be applied to
his pending case.138 The Supreme Court agreed and took the opportunity to clarify
that Landgraf’s presumption against retroactivity did not trump other interpretive
principles.139
The State argued that in the absence of an express command, the Landgraf
presumption was triggered thus ending the inquiry.140 The Court rejected this.141
Ordinary interpretive principles (such as negative implication) may actually remove
the case from Landgraf’s ambit, for example “by rendering the statutory provision
wholly inapplicable to a particular case.”142 In other words, where there is no clear
statement, a court should analyze whether the provision at issue even applies to the
litigant’s case. If the statutory provision at issue does not govern litigant’s case,
then the Landgraf inquiry is unnecessary. Because the AEDPA included an express
effective date clause specifying that Chapter 154 applied to pending cases, this
implied that the provision at issue, Chapter 153, was only meant to apply to future
cases.143 For our purposes, Lindh is important for two reasons: first, Landgraf’s

134. Id.
135. 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
136. Id. at 322–23 (“The issue in this case is whether that new section of the [AEDPA]
dealing with petitions for habeas corpus governs applications in noncapital cases that were
already pending when the Act was passed. We hold that it does not.”).
137. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104,
110 Stat. 1214, 1219; see Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 944–45 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
AEDPA expressly limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court. . . . We have stated that this provision marks a ‘significant change’ and prevents the
district court from looking to lower federal court decisions in determining whether the state
court decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law.”).
138. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (No. 96-6298),
1997 WL 82672.
139. Lindh, 521 U.S. at 324–26.
140. See id. at 325.
141. Id. at 324–26.
142. Id. at 326.
143. Id. at 326–27 (“We read this provision of § 107(c), expressly applying chapter 154
to all cases pending at enactment, as indicating implicitly that the amendments to chapter
153 were assumed and meant to apply to the general run of habeas cases only when those
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presumption against retroactivity does not simply trump ordinary interpretation
principles. And second, Lindh teaches that negative implication analysis is relevant
for retroactivity issues despite the “clear statement” principle.144
Several cases have called into doubt the “exceptional” nature of jurisdictional,
attorney’s fees, and procedural statutes. One of these, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S.
ex rel. Schumer,145 lies at the intersection of FCA and retroactivity jurisprudence.
By the time Hughes Aircraft was decided in 1997, the retroactivity of the 1986
FCA amendments had been litigated for ten years.146 In 1986, the FCA was
amended, in part to lift the jurisdictional bar on qui tam lawsuits where the
government is already aware of the wrongdoing (the so-called government
knowledge bar).147 Respondent filed his FCA suit in 1989, based on conduct from
the early and mid 1980s.148 Defendant argued that the action would be precluded
under the pre-1986 FCA government knowledge bar that was in effect when the
conduct occurred.149 Thus, applying the newly amended FCA language to conduct
pre-dating the amendments would be unfairly retroactive. Respondent countered
that there was no basic unfairness because
the 1986 Amendments to the qui tam bar do not create a new cause of
action where there was none before, change the substance of the extant
cause of action, or alter a defendant’s exposure for a false claim by

cases had been filed after the date of the Act.”). The dissent quarreled with the majority’s
negative inference analysis and would have applied AEDPA to pending cases under
Landgraf’s “procedural cases,” “prospective relief,” and “jurisdictional statute” exceptions.
Id. at 341–43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist raises the possibility that any
inferences we could draw about what Congress intended by including retroactivity language
in Chapter 154 and not Chapter 153 could be countered by equally plausible inferences in
the opposite direction. Id. For example, different language in Chapters 153 and 154 might
have been the result of tacit Congressional agreement to let the courts decide the question of
an effective date. See id.
144. See, e.g., Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 161 F.3d 156, 161–62 (3d Cir. 1998);
see also Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 621 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The
Third Circuit has characterized Lindh as establishing an intermediate step in the Landgraf
framework, requiring courts to examine a statute under normal rules of statutory construction
for evidence of congressional intent to apply the statute prospectively only.” (citing
Mathews, 161 F.3d at 162)); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006) (“A familiar
principle of statutory construction, relevant both in Lindh and here, is that a negative
inference may be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is
included in other provisions of the same statute.”).
145. 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
146. See Part VI for a discussion of the Justice Department’s desire to have FERA avoid
the costly litigation over the effective date of the 1986 FCA amendments.
147. Id. at 946.
148. Id. at 942–43.
149. Id. at 945 (“The allegedly false claims at issue in this case were submitted by
Hughes between 1982 and 1984. At that time, the FCA required a district court to ‘dismiss [a
qui tam] action . . . based on evidence or information the Government had when the action
was brought.’” (alterations in original) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982))).
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even a single penny [and] thus d[o] not increase a party’s liability for
past conduct.150
This line of attack failed. First, depriving the defendant of the government
knowledge bar amounted to the retroactive deprivation of an affirmative defense.151
Second, removing the government knowledge bar empowered more qui tam
relators to sue with different (i.e., purely monetary) incentives from those of the
government.152 This new incentive in effect created a new cause of action.153 Third,
and most puzzlingly, the Court rejected respondent’s argument that the 1986
amendments were jurisdictional and thus did not raise retroactivity concerns under
Landgraf.154 The Court rejected this argument because Landgraf’s reference to
jurisdictional statutes was more narrowly focused on laws that “simply change[]
the tribunal that is to hear the case” rather than those that, as FCA arguably did
here, create jurisdiction where none existed previously.155 But this is not really
convincing. After all, the Court is really just saying that jurisdictional statutes
should be analyzed under ordinary retroactive effect principles, thus calling into
doubt the vitality of the exception that they had articulated in Landgraf.156
Similarly, it is unclear whether attorney’s fees157 and jurisdictional or procedural

150. Id. at 948 (alterations in original) (quoting Brief for Respondent at 15, Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997) (No. 95-1340), 1997 WL
2550 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
151. Id. at 946–52.
152. Hughes Aircraft, 520 U.S. at 949 (“The extension of an FCA cause of action to
private parties in circumstances where the action was previously foreclosed is not
insignificant. As a class of plaintiffs, qui tam relators are different in kind than the
Government. They are motivated primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather than the
public good.”).
153. Id. at 948–50.
154. Id. at 950–51.
155. Id. at 951 (emphasis in original) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 274 (1993)).
156. See Bassett, supra note 31, at 497 (“Taken together, Hughes and Lindh served
effectively to eliminate the exceptions for jurisdictional and procedural legislation that had
been described in Landgraf. Rather than treating such provisions as exceptions to the
presumption against retroactivity, the Court instead evaluated such matters in the same
manner as any other legislation. These decisions undercut Landgraf’s claim that it provides a
purported framework for retroactivity analysis—a point made even more clearly by [Martin
v. Hadix].”).
157. See, e.g., Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1998). The Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) lowered the statutory fee award for prisoner civil rights litigation. Id. at 351–52.
Hadix acknowledged that applying the new lower rate to past legal work would have
retroactive effect, despite the fact that Landgraf had seemed to make an exception for
attorney’s fees statutes: “When determining whether a new statute operates retroactively, it is
not enough to attach a label (e.g., ‘procedural,’ ‘collateral’) . . . .” Id. at 359. However, the
Court held that applying the new lower award for future legal work was not “retroactive,”
despite the fact that attorneys had agreed to undertake representation under the higher, prePLRA fee schedule. Id. at 360–61. The majority reasoned that attorneys were free to refuse
to continue representing clients if they were not happy with the new lower PLRA fee. Id. at
360. Justice Ginsburg reasons convincingly that, to the contrary, altering an attorney’s fees
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statues158 operate as the exceptions to retroactivity that Landgraf had strongly
implied.159
Finally, courts have developed Landgraf’s “retroactive effect” jurisprudence. In
INS v. St. Cyr, for example, the Supreme Court decided the retroactivity
implications of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) and related statutes.160 The question was whether the IIRIRA’s repeal of
discretionary relief from deportation applied retroactively where petitioner had pled
guilty to a felony prior to the statute’s enactment.161 Because petitioner had entered
a plea agreement under an earlier regime where discretionary withholding was
available, it would violate “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable

statute may in fact be retroactive in the disfavored sense: “attorneys engaged before passage
of the PLRA have little leeway to alter their conduct in response to the new legal regime; an
attorney who initiated a prisoner’s rights suit before April 26, 1996, remains subject to a
professional obligation to see the litigation through to final disposition.” Id. at 369
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 693 (2004) (“[W]e
sanctioned the application to all pending and future cases of ‘intervening’ statutes that
merely ‘confe[r] or ous[t] jurisdiction.’ Such application, we stated, ‘usually takes away no
substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.’ Similarly, the
‘diminished reliance interests in matters of procedure’ permit courts to apply changes in
procedural rules ‘in suits arising before [the rules’] enactment without raising concerns about
retroactivity.’” (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274–75)); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576–77 (2006)
(“We have explained . . . that . . . unlike other intervening changes in the law, a jurisdictionconferring or jurisdiction-stripping statute usually ‘takes away no substantive right but
simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.’ . . . That does not mean, however, that
all jurisdiction-stripping provisions—or even all such provisions that truly lack retroactive
effect—must apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment.” (quoting Hallowell v.
Commons, 239 U.S. 506 (1915))); id. at 656 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“An ancient and
unbroken line of authority attests that statutes ousting jurisdiction unambiguously apply to
cases pending at their effective date.”).
159. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274 (“We have regularly applied intervening statutes
conferring or ousting jurisdiction . . .” (emphasis added)); see also id. (“Application of a new
jurisdictional rule usually ‘takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal
that is to hear the case.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Hallowell, 239 U.S. at 508)); id. at 275
(“Because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct, the fact that a
new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make
application of the rule at trial retroactive.” (emphasis added)); id. (“Changes in procedural
rules may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns
about retroactivity.” (emphasis added)). The Court adds a caveat in a footnote that
[o]f course, the mere fact that a new rule is procedural does not mean that it
applies to every pending case. A new rule concerning the filing of complaints
would not govern an action in which the complaint had already been properly
filed under the old regime, and the promulgation of a new rule of evidence
would not require an appellate remand for a new trial.
Id. at 275 n.29.
160. 533 U.S. 289 (2000).
161. See id. at 293.
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reliance, and settled expectations” to deprive him of the quid pro quo implied in the
decision to enter a plea agreement as a means to avoid deportation.162
V. COURTS ARE SPLIT OVER FERA’S RETROACTIVITY
Litigants have begun to test FERA’s retroactivity clause.163 Parts V.A–B discuss
court rulings, which have split into “retroactivity” and “no retroactivity” camps,
neither of which has done a very good job justifying its holdings. Retroactivity
courts reach the right result, but do not conduct a complete Landgraf analysis, nor
do they address the claims/cases question. The “no retroactivity” courts at least
acknowledge the interpretive difficulties, but they reach the wrong result because
they fail to apply a correct and complete Landgraf analysis.
A. Retroactivity Courts
The Second,164 Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have stated or implied that
FERA is retroactive. In United States ex rel. Longhi v. United States, the Fifth
Circuit faced the question of whether the narrow “outcome materiality” standard165
or FERA’s broader materiality standard166 controlled an FCA case filed in 2002.
The Longhi court held that FERA’s materiality standard governed the case,
reasoning that FERA opted for the broader materiality standard adopted by the
Fourth, Ninth, and Sixth Circuits.167 The court declined to rule on whether this was
a “retroactive[] or prospective[]” application of FERA, but held that the new

162. See id. at 321–22.
163. See Burris et al., supra note 84, at 61–62 (noting impact of the FERA amendments
on FCA litigation).
164. Wood ex rel. United States v. Applied Research Assocs., Inc., No. 08-3799-cv, 2009
WL 2143829, at *3 n.2 (2d Cir. July 16, 2009) (acknowledging that some of FERA’s
provisions were retroactive, but holding this did not affect the present case); see also United
States ex rel. Kirk v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 601 F.3d 94, 113 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The
amendment to § 3729(a)(2), but not the amendment to § 3729(a)(1), was made retroactive to
June 7, 2008, applicable to ‘all claims under the False Claims Act . . . that [were] pending on
or after that date.’ Because [relator’s] claim was filed in March 2005, and was pending as of
June 7, 2008, the potentially applicable provisions in this case are former § 3729(a)(1) . . .
and current § 3729(a)(1)(B) . . . .” (citations omitted)).
165. 575 F.3d 458, 468–69 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Southland Mgmt.
Corp., 288 F.3d 665, 676 (5th Cir. 2002)) (defining “outcome materiality” as requiring that
“a falsehood or misrepresentations must affect the government’s ultimate decision whether to
remit funds to the claimant in order to be ‘material’”).
166. Id. at 470. Under FERA,
“‘material’ means having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of
influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.” If Congress
intended materiality to be defined under the more narrow outcome materiality
standard, it had ample opportunity to adopt the outcome materiality standard in
FERA. Instead, Congress embraced the test as stated by the Supreme Court and
several courts of appeals.
Id. (quoting § 3729(b)(4)).
167. Id.
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materiality standard was relevant to interpreting what Congress had intended in the
1986 FCA amendments.168
The Seventh Circuit, in United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., noted
that FERA section 4(f) generally applies its amendments to § 3729(a) to postenactment conduct.169 As an aside, however, the Court added that there was “an
exception for the changes to § 3729(a)(1)(B), but that does not affect [relator’s §
3729(a)(7)] action.”170 In United States ex rel. Lacy v. New Horizons, Inc., the
Tenth Circuit stated in a footnote that “a very few of the Act’s provisions apply
retroactively to [plaintiff’s] claims. . . . Of those provisions expressly made
retroactive, none establishes or changes the pleading requirements for an FCA
complaint.”171
The District Courts for the Eastern District of Virginia,172 the Northern District
of Illinois,173 the Northern District of Georgia,174 the Northern District of Texas,175
and the Eastern District of Louisiana176 have stated—or implied—that FERA
operates retroactively. These courts do not explicitly address the claims/cases issue.
United States ex rel. Walner v. NorthShore, for example, simply applies FERA to a
pending case as if the referent for claims were self evident: “Section 4(f)(1) of
[FERA] states that § 3729(a)(1)(B) applies to all claims pending on and after June
7, 2008 . . . . [B]ecause [plaintiff’s] claim was pending on June 7, 2008, the Court
will apply the new version . . . .”177 Likewise, United States ex rel. Stephens v.
Tissue Science Laboratories held that

168. Id. (citing NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank v. Cowden, 895 F.2d 1488, 1500 (5th Cir. 1990)
(“[A] legislative body may amend statutory language to make what was intended all along
even more unmistakably clear.” (quoting United States v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 761 F.2d
998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1985))). The position of the Fifth Circuit on the retroactivity of FERA is
not clear. In a criminal money laundering case, United States v. Bueno, 585 F.3d 847 (5th
Cir. 2009), Judge DeMoss stated in a special concurrence that FERA “is silent on
retroactivity; therefore, it only applies to conduct which occurs post-amendment,” id. at 853
n.4 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994)).
169. 570 F.3d 849, 855 n.* (7th Cir. 2009).
170. Id. (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. 244).
171. 348 F. App’x 421, 424 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009).
172. United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., No. 1:08cv1162, 2009 WL 2240331,
at *5 n.3 (E.D. Va. July 23, 2009) (“Because this case was pending on June 7, 2008, the
Court has applied the amendment in § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2009) to Count 4, a claim originally
brought under § 3729(a)(2) (1994).”).
173. United States ex rel. Walner v. NorthShore Univ. Health Sys., 660 F. Supp. 2d 891,
895 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
174. United States ex rel. Stephens v. Tissue Sci. Labs., 664 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315 n.2
(N.D. Ga. 2009).
175. United States ex rel. Dekort v. Integrated Coast Guard Sys., No. 3:06-CV-1792-O,
2010 WL 1330521, at *8 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2010) (applying prior version of FCA except
for the amendments to § 3729(a)(2), which apply retroactively).
176. United States ex rel. Branch Consultants, L.L.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d
780, 803–4 (E.D. La. 2009) (applying amended FERA language to pending case without
noting the retroactivity issue).
177. 660 F. Supp. 2d at 895 n.3 (citations omitted).
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[a]lthough most of [FERA’s] changes apply only to conduct on or after
the day of enactment, changes to § 3729(a)(1)(B) are effective
retroactive to June 7, 2008, and apply to all claims under the FCA
pending on or after that date. Because this action was pending on June
7, 2008, the amended § 3729(a)(1)(B) applies to this action.178
As I explain in Part VI, this reading has the best support in FERA’s structure,
intent, and overall restorative purpose to “clarify” and “correct” the holdings of
Allison Engine and Totten.
B. No Retroactivity Courts
The District Courts of Idaho,179 Delaware,180 the District of Columbia,181 New
Jersey,182 and New Mexico,183 as well as the Southern District of Ohio,184 the
Eastern District of Arkansas,185 the Middle District of Georgia,186 the Western

178. 664 F. Supp. 2d at 1315 n.2 (citations omitted).
179. United States ex rel. Putnam v. E. Idaho Reg’l Med. Ctr., 696 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1196
(D. Idaho 2010) (“Congress’s use of the words ‘claims’ and ‘cases’ when amending the FCA
and providing for retroactive application of certain subsections therefore illustrates that it
intended claims to encompass claims for money or property that are governed by the FCA,
not cases brought to enforce it.”).
180. United States v. Aguillon, 628 F. Supp. 2d 542 (D. Del. 2009).
181. United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2009); see
also United States ex rel. Bender v. N. Am. Telecomm., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48 n.4
(D.D.C. 2010) (granting motion to dismiss because claims means request for payment)
(citing Sci. Applications, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 107); Boone v. MountainMade Found., 684 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 78 n.7 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Because the conduct underlying the plaintiffs’ allegations
occurred well before the enactment of the FERA, its amendments to § 3729(a)(1) do not
apply here. Moreover, because the purportedly false claims for payment at issue here were
made in 2006 . . . and because there is no indication that they were still pending as of the
June 7, 2008 cutoff date provided for in the FERA’s retroactivity clause, the FERA’s
amendments to § 3729(a)(2) likewise do not apply.” (citations omitted)). But see United
States ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d 129, 137
(D.D.C. 2010) (“FERA provided for § 3729(a)(1)(B)’s retroactive application ‘to all claims
under the False Claims Act . . . that are pending on or after’ June 7, 2008. Because this suit
was pending on June 7, 2008, the amended provision applies here.” (citation omitted)).
182. United States ex rel. Pilecki-Simko v. Chubb Inst., No. 06-3562, 2010 WL 1076228,
at *4 n.10 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2010) (finding no retroactivity because claims refers to requests
for payment).
183. United States ex rel. Baker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 05-279 WJ/WDS, 2010
WL 1740624, at *15–17 (D.N.M. Mar. 19, 2010) (adopting the technical definition to reject
retroactivity).
184. United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D.
Ohio 2009).
185. United States ex rel. Burroughs v. Cent. Ark. Dev. Council, No. 4:08CV2757 JMM,
2010 WL 1542532, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 19, 2010) (applying earlier FCA language because
claims means requests for payment and defendant had no outstanding requests as of June 7,
2008).
186. United States ex rel. Parato v. Unadilla Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 5:07-CV-76(HL),
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District of Texas,187 the Northern District of Illinois,188 and the Southern District of
Florida,189 have held that FERA is not retroactive.190 United States v. Aguillon was
the first case to address the retroactivity issue and concluded that FERA did not
provide the requisite clear statement of retroactive intent required by Landgraf v.
USI Film Products: “Although the Congressional record implies retrospective
application it directed against applying the amendments in a way that would cause
retroactive effects. Congress has not provided the requisite instruction necessary for
the amendments to be used to cause retroactive effects.”191
United States v. Science Applications International Corp. rejected retroactivity
on two grounds. First, the court held that claims takes the special statutory
meaning,192 a holding which is unwarranted: the fact that a statute includes a
technical definition, standing alone, does not preclude the word from being used in
other senses throughout the statute.193 Second, the negative implication canon
revealed that the use of claims in section 4(f)(1) and cases in section 4(f)(2) means
that claims in (f)(1) meant something other than cases.194 In other words, the fact
that Congress uses the word claims in section 4(f)(1) and cases in section 4(f)(2)
implies that they must have had a different reference point in mind for each
provision (or else they would have chosen the same language for both).195 The
2010 WL 146877, at *4 n.4 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2010) (“For purposes of the FCA, a ‘claim’ is
defined as a ‘request or demand . . . for money or property.’ The revised version of section
(a)(1)(B) does not apply to this case because none of Defendants’ claims at issue here (the
grant request or Medicare reimbursement claims) were pending on or after June 7, 2008.”
(alteration in original) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2006))); see also United States ex rel.
Compton v. Circle B Enters., Inc., No. 7:07-cv-31 (HL), 2010 WL 942293, at *2 n.5 (M.D.
Ga. Mar. 11, 2010) (adopting technical definition of claims and rejecting retroactivity).
187. United States ex rel. Gonzalez v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., No. EP-07-CV-247PRM, 2010 WL 1645971, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2010) (applying earlier language on the
theory that claims means requests for payment).
188. Mason v. Medline Indus., No. 07 C 5615, 2010 WL 653542, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18,
2010) (holding that FERA did not apply retroactively because claims means request for
payment) (citing Hopper v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1327 n.3 (11th Cir. 2009);
Allison Engine, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 750–51; U.S. v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 653 F. Supp.
2d 87, 106–07 (D.D.C. 2009)).
189. United States ex rel. Cullins v. Astra, Inc., No. 09-60696-CIV, 2010 WL 625279, at
*2 n.2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2010) (finding amendments not retroactive).
190. Another court has stated without explanation that “since the time of the
government’s Complaint, the FCA has been amended. In this Opinion, all references to 31
U.S.C. § 3729 refer to the version of the FCA in force at the time of the alleged violations.”
United States v. Edelstein, No. 3:07-52, 2009 WL 2982884, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 16,
2009) (citations omitted).
191. United States v. Aguillon, 628 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550–51 (D. Del. 2009). The major
problem with the Aguillon holding is that does not provide an adequate analysis of the plain
language of the statute for congressional intent. Had it done so, it would have found the
express retroactivity clause in FERA section 4(f)(1) that I discuss below. See infra Part VI.
192. See United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 87, 106–07
(D.D.C. 2009).
193. See infra Part VI.A.2.
194. See Sci. Applications, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 107.
195. See Part VI.A.6 for a discussion of the problems with analyzing section 4(f)(1) of
FERA under a negative implication rubric. See also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330
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remaining “no-retroactivity” courts follow the reasoning of Science Applications to
hold that the new FCA language does not apply to pending cases, in part because
the conduct at issue took place before June 7, 2008.196
VI. LANDGRAF RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS OF FERA
Based on the foregoing analysis, I will first determine if FERA includes a clear
statement of retroactive intent. To answer this question, I ask “whether Congress
has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.”197 The clear statement rule
ensures that “Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness
of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the
countervailing benefits.”198 Because of the special concerns arising from potential
retroactive operation, the statement must be “so clear that it could sustain only one
interpretation.”199 The clear statement may be found through negative
implication.200 If statutory text is not clear, legislative history provides guidance.201
Next, I will apply ordinary interpretive principles to determine the scope of
retroactivity, which will require a resolution of the claims/cases issue.202
(1997) (“[N]egative implications raised by disparate provisions are strongest when the
portions of a statute treated differently had already been joined together and were being
considered simultaneously when the language raising the implication was inserted.”); Field
v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75 (1995) (“The more apparently deliberate the contrast, the stronger
the inference, as applied, for example, to contrasting statutory sections originally enacted
simultaneously in relevant respects . . . .” (emphasis added)).
196. See Hopper v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1327 n.3 (11th Cir. 2009)
(“While this case was pending on and after June 7, 2008, the relators do not allege that any
claims, as defined by § 3729(b)(2)(A), were pending on or after June 7, 2008. Therefore, we
conclude the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act does not apply retroactively to this case.”
(citing Sci. Applications, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 106–07)); see also United States ex rel. Cullins
v. Astra, Inc., No. 09-60696-CIV, 2010 WL 625279, at *2 n.2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2010)
(citing to Hopper, 588 F.3d at 1327 n.3, to conclude that FERA does not apply retroactively);
United States ex rel. Parato v. Unadilla Health Care Cent., Inc., No. 5:07-CV-76(HL), 2010
WL 146877, at *4 n.4 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2010) (“The revised version of section (a)(1)(B)
does not apply to this case because none of Defendants’ claims at issue here . . . were
pending on or after June 7, 2008.” (citing Sci. Applications, 653 F.Supp.2d at 106–07));
United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750–51 (S.D.
Ohio 2009) (holding that claims takes technical meaning supported by negative implication
and legislative history) (citing Sci. Applications, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 106–07); Bridges v.
Omega World Travel, Inc., No. 4:07cv01060 BSM, 2009 WL 5174283, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Dec.
18, 2009) (“The FCA was recently amended by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of
2009. Although the sections of the FCA at issue in this case were amended, those
amendments did not have retroactive application. Therefore, the FCA is interpreted herein as
it existed prior to the 2009 amendments.” (citations omitted)).
197. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
198. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316 (2001) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 272–73 (1988)).
199. Lindh, 521 U.S. at 328 n.4.
200. See id. at 327.
201. See id. at 330.
202. Deweese v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 590 F.3d 239, 251 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In
deciding whether a statute has a retroactive effect, a court must determine the ‘important
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I conclude that FERA contains an express retroactivity clause: section 4(f)(1)
names a specific pre-enactment day, June 7, 2008, as its effective date, and it
applies to claims pending on or after that day. Whatever claims means, the statute
increases the liability of subcontractors and others who were not liable under FCA
previously because they had benefitted from the holdings of Totten and Allison
Engine. Legislative history shows that Congress intended the FCA amendments to
overrule the holding of Allison Engine.203 Standing alone, this is enough for FERA
to operate retroactively. Because Congress clearly intended FERA to operate
retroactively to overrule the holding of the Supreme Court in Allison Engine, and
because claims means cases, FERA should be applied to any case pending on or
after June 7, 2008.
Although FERA’s express language and legislative history resolves the
retroactivity issue, I also provide a retroactive effect analysis of FERA for the sake
of completeness. The retroactive effect inquiry tests the fairness and equity of
applying a new statute to events preceding its enactment.204 We apply normal
statutory interpretation principles to determine retroactive effect.205 These
principles reveal that applying FERA to past events (absent express intent) would
have an impermissibly retroactive effect.
A. FERA Includes an Express Retroactivity Provision
A clear statement of retroactive intent requires unambiguous language
describing the temporal reach of the statute.206 This language may be located in
legislative history or found through negative implication.207 FERA clearly
expresses retroactive intent by unambiguously designating a pre-enactment day,
June 7, 2008, as the effective date for the FERA amendment to FCA § 3729(a).
This reference to a pre-enactment date evinces clear intent for the statute to apply in
a way that would effectively impose a new legal standard on already-completed
events.
1. FERA’s Retroactivity Language Is Clear on Its Face
The clear statement rule tests whether Congress considered the potential
downside of retroactivity, an area that raises particular “quasi-constitutional”
concerns.208 Retroactivity language must be “so clear that it could sustain only one
event’ to which the statute allegedly attaches new legal consequences.”).
203. See infra Part VI.A.3.
204. See supra Part V.
205. See supra Part V.
206. See supra Part V.
207. See supra Part V.
208. See supra Part V; see also LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 244 (2008) (“The requirement of a clear, or plain, statement is based on the
simple assumption that a legislature would not make major changes without being absolutely
clear about doing so.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992)
(arguing that “super-strong clear statement rules” are a way that courts can force legislators
to focus on otherwise underenforced constitutional norms).
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interpretation.”209 Although there are no “magic words” that signify retroactive
intent, courts have provided some guidance.210 For example, Landgraf stated that
the 1990 Civil Rights Act expressed clear retroactive intent: “[This Act] shall apply
to all proceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment of this
Act.”211 The same year as Landgraf, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “shall
apply to all proceedings ‘pending on or commenced after’” a certain date
“assuredly would have applied to pending cases.”212 Lindh v. Murphy noted a
number of Supreme Court decisions that had found a clear statement for retroactive
intent.213 Graham v. Goodcell, for example, held that a tax “was manifestly
intended to operate retroactively . . . . [where] it expressly applied to internal
revenue taxes which had been assessed prior to June 2, 1924, and within the period
of limitation applicable to the assessment.”214 Automobile Club of Michigan v.
Commissioner, identified the following to be a clear statement: “The Secretary, or
the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe the extent, if
any, to which any ruling, regulation, or Treasury Decision, relating to the internal
revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect.”215 Hadix found an
“express command” in the statement that “[this section] shall apply with respect to
all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before,
on, or after the date of the enactment of this title.”216 Lockheed Corp. v. Spink

209. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 317 (2001) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,
328 n.4 (1997)).
210. See John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1541, 1557–58 (2008) (“It is true, of course, that judges can disagree about the question
whether a statute is clear. But one can at least articulate a plausible standard against which to
argue about clarity: if all or almost all of those conversant with applicable social and
linguistic conventions would agree upon a statute’s meaning, the outcome can be said to be
clear in context. In such a case, where almost all interpreters (sharing a common
methodology) would agree that the evidence points decisively in one direction, only the most
dedicated rule skeptics would hesitate to attribute the resultant interpretation to Congress.”
(footnotes omitted)).
211. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 255 n.8 (1994) (quoting S. 2104, 101st
Cong. §15(a)(4) (1990)); see also id. at 255 (“[T]he 1990 bill . . . contained language
expressly calling for application of many of its provisions, including the section providing
for damages in cases of intentional employment discrimination, to cases arising before its
(expected) enactment.”).
212. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 307–08 (1994).
213. 521 U.S. at 328 n.4.
214. 282 U.S. 409, 418 (1931). The relevant provision reads:
If any internal-revenue tax (or any interest, penalty, additional amount, or
addition to such tax) was . . . assessed prior to June 2, 1924 . . . then the
payment of such part (made before or within one year after the enactment of
this Act) shall not be considered as an overpayment under the provisions of
section 607, relating to payments made after the expiration of the period of
limitation on assessment and collection.
Id. at 432 n.1.
215. 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 3791(b) (1939)); see also Lindh, 521
U.S. at 328 n.4 (citing Auto. Club of Mich., 353 U.S. at 184).
216. Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 355 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997(e)(d)(3)).
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provided that the following was a clear statement of prospective intent: “[The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986] expressly provides that ‘[t]he
amendments . . . shall apply only with respect to plan years beginning on or after
January 1, 1988 . . . .’”217 More recently, INS v. St. Cyr found the following
language to be a clear statement: “‘conviction[s] . . . entered before, on, or after’ the
statute’s enactment date.”218 These cases show that the more specific and concrete
the temporal language is, the more likely a court is to find that it is a clear
statement of retroactivity.219
Section 4(f)(1) of FERA echoes this retroactivity language. For example,
FERA’s phrase “pending on or after that date” resembles the Rivers v. Roadway
clear statement “shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after.”220
In Goodcell, the approved language mentions a specific pre-enactment date, as does
FERA.221 St. Cyr identifies the phrase “before, on, or after” as a clear retroactivity
statement and FERA includes the phrase “pending on or after.”222 FERA’s
provision includes a similar combination of phrases “shall take effect . . . on
[specific day] . . . and apply to all claims . . . pending on or after that date” as that
found in other cases.223 The overlap between FERA’s effective date language and

217. 517 U.S. 882, 896 (1996) (quoting the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9204(a)(1)); see also Thorn v. BAE Sys. Haw. Shipyards, Inc., No. 0800058 JMS/BMK, 2009 WL 274507, at *2 (D. Haw. Feb. 2, 2009) (“[T]he ADA Amendment
indicates a preference for prospective application—‘This Act and the amendments made by
this Act shall become effective on January 1, 2009.’” (quoting ADA Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. 110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559)).
218. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 319 (2001) (quoting Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, § 321(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009628).
219. Justice Scalia has indicated that a clear statement does not even require this much:
Even in those areas of our jurisprudence where we have adopted a “clear
statement” rule (notably, the sovereign immunity cases to which the Court
adverts), clear statement has never meant the kind of magic words demanded
by the Court today—explicit reference to habeas or to § 2241—rather than
reference to “judicial review” in a statute that explicitly calls habeas corpus a
form of judicial review. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, we said: “This [the Court’s
clear-statement requirement] does not mean that the [Age Discrimination in
Employment] Act must mention [state] judges explicitly, though it does not.
Rather, it must be plain to anyone reading the Act that it covers judges.”
Id. at 333–34 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 467 (1991)).
220. 511 U.S. 298, 307 (1994); see also Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) expressed
clear retroactive intent); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 7902(b) (2006) (PLCAA) (“Dismissal of Pending
Actions[:] A qualified civil liability action that is pending on [the date of enactment of this
Act], shall be immediately dismissed by the court in which the action was brought or is
currently pending.”).
221. Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 418 (1931).
222. 533 U.S. at 319.
223. See, e.g., Martinez v. INS, 523 F.3d 365, 370 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Notwithstanding any
other provision of law (including any effective date), the term . . . applies regardless of
whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after [September 30, 1996].” (quoting
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judicially approved retroactivity language qualifies it as a clear statement of
retroactive intent.
Similarly, FERA’s stated purpose to “clarify” Totten and Allison Engine points
towards retroactive intent. In Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., the companion case
to Landgraf, the Supreme Court faced the retroactivity of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act.224 As is the case with FERA, one purpose of the Civil Rights Act addressed in
Rivers was to legislatively overrule federal decisions construing an earlier version
of the statute.225 The 1990 version was vetoed but included language that indicated
that the new law “assuredly . . . applied to pending cases.”226 Several combined
factors led to this conclusion: (1) the “Purpose” section of the 1990 version
“unambiguously declared that it was intended to ‘respond to the Supreme Court’s
recent decisions by restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically
limited by those decisions’”;227 (2) the section responding to the disapproved case
was titled “Restoring Prohibition Against All Racial Discrimination in the Making
and Enforcement of Contracts”;228 and (3) the 1990 version included the language
“‘shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after’ the date of the
Patterson decision.”229 FERA shares the linguistic pattern indicating restorative and
retroactive intent: (1) section 4 of FERA is titled “Clarifications to the False Claims
Act to Reflect the Original Intent of the Law”; (2) the effective date provision states
that it applies to “claims . . . that are pending on or after that date.”230
2. Claims Means Cases
Recall that either definition of claims will alter the legal significance of
completed transactions.231 This is because if claims means request for payment, a
false claim submitted on, say, June 7, 2008 will entail potential subcontractor
liability under the new FERA amendments, which would not have been so under
Totten and Allison Engine, the law in existence at the time of the conduct. If, on the
other hand, claims means cases, subcontractor defendants in lawsuits pending on or
after June 7, 2008, but who did not present their claims directly to the government,
would potentially be liable for conduct occurring many years before.232 Although
either definition creates retroactive effect, our choice between them will be
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, §
321(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628) (alternations in original)); Sadhvani v. Chertoff, 460
F. Supp. 2d 114, 121 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that the phrase “effective immediately and
applicable ‘to cases in which the final administrative order of removal . . . was issued before,
on, or after’” indicated retroactive intent).
224. 511 U.S. 298 (1994).
225. Id. at 307–08.
226. Id. at 307.
227. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
228. Id. (emphasis in original).
229. Id. at 308; see also id. at 307 n.7 (stating that the “restorative purpose” standing
alone was not dispositive, but when combined with the other language in the 1990 version
pointed to retroactive intent).
230. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4, 123 Stat.
1617, 1621–25.
231. See supra Part I.
232. See supra Part I.
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enormously consequential. The question, then, is how to make the choice. But
before I answer this, I must first correct an important mistake that has led a number
of FERA courts astray: namely, that where a statute provides a technical definition
of a word or phrase, that term always takes the special meaning wherever it appears
in the statute.233 So, for example, because claims is defined in FCA as request for
payment, it must always mean request for payment wherever it appears. It is not
hard to see why this is false: a technical term will only control interpretation where
the term is being used in the same technical way in the provision we are
interpreting as it is where it is defined by the statute.234 The mere fact that a statute
defines a term does not in itself mean that that definition controls every iteration of
that word in the statute. To assume otherwise is to make the mistake indentified by
the Supreme Court in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline.235 Petitioner
invoked the “presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same
act are intended to have the same meaning”236 to argue that the word “age” meant
the same thing every time it was used in the ADEA. The Court explained that we
cannot invoke this presumption where we can reasonably conclude the word is used
in different senses throughout the statute.237 “The presumption of uniform usage . . .
relents when a word used has several commonly understood meanings among
which a speaker can alternate in the course of an ordinary conversation, without
being confused or getting confusing.”238 Several courts have simply assumed
without explanation or justification that FCA’s definition of claims as “requests for
payment” resolves the apparent ambiguity in FERA’s effective date provision.239 In
place of this blanket assumption, however, we instead must ask whether claims has
“several commonly understood meanings among which a speaker can alternate.”240
The answer to that question is yes. The fact that section 4(f)(1) embeds claims in
the phrase “claims . . . under the False Claims Act,” coupled with the frequent use
of claims as a synonym for cases, both in FERA and general legal usage, reveals
that claims is not being used in a technical way in the retroactivity clause.

233. Schneider v. Chertoff, 450 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nless otherwise
defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.” (quoting United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998))).
234. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 594–95 (2004).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 595 (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433
(1932)). The Court went on to say, “[T]he presumption is not rigid and readily yields
whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably
to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different
intent.” Id. (quoting Atl. Cleaners, 286 U.S. at 433). The Court cited United States v.
Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 213 (2001), for the proposition that “‘wages
paid’ has different meanings in different parts of Title 26 U.S.C.,” and Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343–44 (1997), for the proposition that the “term ‘employee’ has different
meanings in different parts of Title VII.” Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 595–96 (footnote omitted).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 87, 106–07
(D.D.C. 2009).
240. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004).
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a) Reading Claims as Part of a Whole Phrase
As with all interpretive questions, we read disputed statutory language in
context.241 Our first piece of contextual evidence is that claims is embedded in the
phrase: “all claims under the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq.) that are
pending on or after that date.”242 When we plug our two definitions of claims into
this phrase, it quickly becomes apparent that the technical definition would not be a
natural fit. It does not make sense to say that a claim submitted for payment to the
government or another contractor is a claim “under the False Claims Act.” While it
is true that such conduct would be “under the jurisdiction” of FCA, we would not
normally say that a request for payment is submitted “under” a statute that might be
violated by its submission. It is also true that FCA defines claim as “any request or
demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property and whether
or not the United States has title to the money or property.”243 But the use of
“under” in the definition of claim counts as evidence against importing the
technical reading in the retroactivity clause, because its inclusion in section 4(f)(1)
would be redundant (i.e., “a claim under a contract under the False Claims Act”). If
Congress had intended to have the new rule apply exclusively to conduct that took
place on or after June 7, 2008, it could simply have said so, as it did with earlier
versions of the statute.244
Additionally, claims as cases tracks common legal usage. Courts routinely use
the phrase “claim under the False Claims Act” and cognate phrases in the generic
sense to mean “lawsuits brought under the False Claims Act.”245 The FCA itself

241. See Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson,
545 U.S. 409, 415 (2005).
242. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(f), 123 Stat.
1617, 1625.
243. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2010); see also United States ex rel.
Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[E]ach and every
claim submitted under a contract, loan guarantee, or other agreement which was originally
obtained by means of false statements or other corrupt or fraudulent conduct, or in violation
of any statute or applicable regulation, constitutes a false claim.” (emphasis added) (quoting
S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9 (1986))).
244. See, e.g., S. 2041, 110th Cong. § 9(b) (2007) (“The amendments made by section 2
shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply to conduct occurring
after the date of enactment.”).
245. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp., Inc., 914 F. Supp.
1507, 1512 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (“[T]he court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim under the False
Claims Act.” (emphasis added) (discussing United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, 557
F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1977))); see also United States ex rel. Stephens v. Tissue Sci. Lab., 664 F.
Supp. 2d 1310, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (“Claims brought pursuant to the FCA must also meet
the particularity requirement.” (emphasis added)); United States ex rel. Gay v. Lincoln
Technical Inst., Inc., No. Civ.A. 301CV505K, 2003 WL 22474586, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3,
2003) (“Even if Relators had alleged sufficient facts, they would have still failed to state a
cognizable claim under the False Claims Act.” (emphasis added)); United States ex rel.
Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2006) (“This case involves
allegations under the False Claims Act . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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uses the prepositional “under” construction in this same way.246 If section 4(f)(1)
did not include the prepositional phrase beginning “under,” the technical reading
might be rescued (although it would still be a stretch). As it stands, however, to
make sense at all, we would need to exclude the “under the False Claims Act”
phrase, which the rule against redundancy will not permit us to do.
The generic meaning does not cause this problem. Lawyers and judges often use
the word “claims” interchangeably with “case,” “legal theory,” “lawsuit,” and so
on, as does the FCA itself.247 Thus, the generic reading comports with our
expectation of how claims is ordinarily used by legislators and courts.248 As well as
fitting better with its common usage, the generic meaning avoids rendering the
phrase “under the False Claims Act” redundant. This is because it is not redundant
to specify that the amendment applies to cases brought “under the False Claims
Act” since there are cases pending in federal courts under myriad legal theories.
“Cases pending under the False Claims Act” accounts for each word in the phrase
in a way that the technical meaning does not. It thus avoids the rule against
redundancy.
b) Reading Claims as Part of the Whole Statute
When FCA uses claims in its technical sense, it is clear from context that it is
being used as such and is often embedded in a phrase such as “false or fraudulent
claim.” For example, the key liability provisions § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B) use the
phrase “false or fraudulent claim” when specifying the proscribed behavior.249
Similarly, § 3729(a)(2)(A) includes the phrase “false claims violations.”250 Claims
appears throughout § 3733 in the phrases “false claims investigation,” “false claims
law,” or “false claims act.”251 Of course, the word also appears in the Definitions
section, § 3729(b)(2).252

246. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2006) (“[T]he Attorney General may bring a civil
action under this section . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also id. § 3730(b)(3) (“The defendant
shall not be required to respond to any complaint filed under this section . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
247. See infra Part VI.A.2.b.
248. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281–82 (9th ed. 2009) (“claim, n. 1. The aggregate
of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court . . . . 2. The assertion of an
existing right; any right to payment or to an equitable remedy, even if contingent or
provisional . . . . 3. A demand for money, property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a
right; esp., the part of a complaint in a civil action specifying what relief the plaintiff asks
for.”); see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 698 n.18 (“The office of the
word ‘henceforth’ [in the statute at issue] is to make the statute effective with respect to
claims to immunity thereafter asserted. Notably, any such claim asserted immediately after
the statute became effective would necessarily have related to conduct that took place at an
earlier date.” (emphasis added)).
249. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B) (West Supp. 2010).
250. Id. § 3729(a)(2)(A).
251. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3733(a)(1) (2006) (“a false claims law investigation”); see
also id. § 3733(a)(2)(A) (“alleged violation of a false claims law”).
252. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b) (West Supp. 2010).
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Claims is frequently used throughout FCA interchangeably with case or civil
action. Section 3730 explains the scope of government and private power to bring
civil actions under FCA. Several provisions in the same section use the word
claims interchangeably with case or cause of action:
§ 3730(c)(5) “the Government may elect to pursue its claim through
any alternate remedy available to the Government . . . .”
§ 3730(d)(1) “[i]f the Government proceeds with an action brought by
a person . . . such person shall . . . receive at least 15 percent but not
more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the
claim . . . .”
§ 3730(d)(2) “the person bringing the action or settling the claim . . . .”
§ 3730(d)(4) “if the defendant prevails in the action and the court finds
that the claim of the person bringing the action was clearly
frivolous . . . .”253
Section 3731(c) finds Congress again using claims interchangeably with civil
action and causes of action: “the Government may file its own complaint . . . to
clarify or add detail to the claims in which the Government is intervening and to
add any additional claims with respect to which the Government contends it is
entitled to relief.”254 Section 3732 delimits the jurisdiction in which an FCA action
may be brought. The heading of §3732(b) is “Claims Under State Law.”255 Section
(b) then goes on to talk about jurisdiction over “actions.”256 In short, Congress
commonly uses claims as a synonym for cases in the FCA. Where a technical
meaning is intended in the statute, it is part of the Definitions section, or it appears
in § 3733 as part of the phrase “false claims law investigator” or a variant.257
Because the term claims is used in this generic sense throughout the statute, it is not
a strong candidate for the presumption in favor of the statutory definition.258
3. FERA’s Legislative History
The retroactivity issue is resolved at the textual level because “claims under the
False Claims Act” means “lawsuits under the False Claims Act.” Where textual
language is clear, there is no need to resort to legislative history.259 However,
despite the predominance of textualist methodologies, retroactivity courts routinely

253. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5), (d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(4) (2006) (emphasis added).
254. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3731(c) (West Supp. 2010).
255. 31 U.S.C. § 3732(b) (2006).
256. Id.; see also 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(d) (West Supp. 2010) (“This section does not apply
to claims, records, or statements made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”).
257. See supra note 251.
258. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 594–95 (2004).
259. See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) (“[G]iven the straightforward
statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history.” (citing Conn. Nat’l
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992))).
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examine legislative history for congressional intent.260 Thus, I will do so here. Not
every piece of legislative history is equally authoritative.261 Professors William
Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett provide a “Hierarchy of
Legislative History Sources” that, while not setting forth an exclusive list of valid
legislative materials, will guide my inquiry.262 In descending order of importance,
these sources are: (1) committee reports;263 (2) explanatory statements by the
legislation’s sponsors;264 and (3) drafting and deliberation history.265 I examine
each of these sources below. In sum, FERA’s legislative history shows that
Congress intended to overrule Allison Engine and Totten but does not definitively
resolve the claims/cases question.
a) Prior Drafts of FERA
The FERA Committee Report refers us to precursor legislation—the False
Claims Act Corrections Act of 2008 (“Corrections Act”).266 The Corrections Act
was introduced on September 12, 2007 by Senator Charles Grassley267 who was
joined by original co-sponsors Senators Durbin, Leahy, Specter, and
Whitehouse.268 It was then referred to the Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator
Leahy.269 The Judiciary Report begins with a history of the FCA, and leads up to

260. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1994); see also
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 579–80 (2006).
261. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 64
(2009) (“Given the presence of contradictory materials in [legislative history] courts have
developed guidance to determine the most reliable sources of intent.”).
262. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 92, at 302–08.
263. Id. at 302 (explaining that committee reports are a useful source to glean general and
specific intent); see also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“In surveying
legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the
Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill . . . .”); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48A:11, at 676 (6th ed. 2000) (“‘A committee
report represents the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen
involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.’ . . . Committee reports are often the
best evidence of bicameral agreement, either because the House and Senate reports are
identical, or because a conference report explicates the chambers’ resolution of differences.”
(quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))).
264. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 92, at 303–04 (citing N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell,
456 U.S. 512 (1982)).
265. Id. at 305.
266. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 n.2 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438 (“The
provisions in Section 4 were drawn, in significant part, from the Committee’s previous work
on S. 2041, the False Claims Act Corrections Act of 2008, in the 110th Congress. . . . The
Committee feels that the report to S. 2041, S. Rpt. 110-507, should be read as a complement
to this report due to a number of similar changes contained in S. 386.” (emphasis added)).
267. S. REP. NO. 110-507, at 9 (2008). Senator Grassley was a key player in the genesis of
FERA’s amendments to FCA. This is unsurprising, as he was also the sponsor of the major
1986 amendments to FCA.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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the 1986 FCA amendments.270 A section titled “The Importance of the False
Claims Act,” begins by stating that “[t]he need for a robust FCA cannot be
understated”271 and emphasizes the taxpayer dollars that have been recovered since
the 1986 amendments.272 The report cites new areas of fraud, such as Medicare and
Medicaid, with estimates of possible losses as high as $16.25 billion.273 The
“purpose” section describes the FCA’s “noble goals” of rooting out fraud and notes
that the courts had created “conflicting interpretations” of FCA that led to
inconsistent outcomes that varied from “court to court.”274 By clarifying the
original intent of the law, the Senate hoped to “assist practitioners, judges, and
businesses across the country by providing clarity and certainty to the FCA.”275
b) The Evolution of FERA’s Effective Date Language
The Judiciary Committee held a hearing on February 27, 2008 titled: “The False
Claims Act Correction Act (S. 2041): Strengthening the Government’s Most
Effective Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Century.”276 The Department of Justice
expressed concerns that there would be extensive litigation regarding FERA’s
effective date as there had been following the 1986 FCA amendments.277 In
response to these concerns, the Committee added an effective date provision that
would cover “all cases pending on the date of enactment, and to all cases filed
thereafter.”278 This is a simple, express retroactivity provision. The Justice
Department filed a second letter in April 2008 expressing concern that it “was not
clear whether the effective date should apply to all parts of the bill or only to its
procedural provisions.”279 In response, the Committee changed the language again,
this time creating a two-tiered provision with a default retroactivity rule plus
exceptions for the amendments to the substantive liability provisions of FCA:
(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided under sub sections (b) and (c),
the amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of
enactment of this Act and shall apply to all civil actions filed before,
on, or after that date.
(b) FALSE CLAIMS.—The amendments made by section 2 shall take
effect on the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply to conduct
occurring after that date of enactment.
(c) STATUTE OF LIMITATION.—The amendment made to section
3731(b)(1) of title 31, United States Code, by section 6 of this Act shall

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 1–5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 30.
Id.
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take effect on the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply to civil
actions filed after that date of enactment.280
As the Committee Report explains, this change was meant to clarify that “the
substantive liability provisions amended in § 3729 take effect upon the date of
enactment” and apply to conduct on or after that date.281 This effective date
provision is almost a mirror image of FERA’s. It begins with default retroactivity
(“all civil actions filed before, on, or after that date”) and then carves out
prospectivity for the amendments to FCA’s substantive liability sections. If this
language had remained in section 4(f) of FERA, there would be no question that it
did not apply retroactively. This language, however, was not included in FERA,
which instead makes the substantive revisions retroactive. The Corrections Act was
reported out of the Judiciary Committee on September 25, 2008, but no action was
taken on it.
c) The Senate Judiciary Report for FERA
Several months after the onset of the financial crisis, Senators Leahy, Grassley,
and Kaufman introduced the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009.282 On
February 11, 2009, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing titled “The Need
for Increased Fraud Enforcement in the Wake of the Economic Downturn.”283 At
the hearing, the Committee heard testimony from the FBI Director, the Special
Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and the Acting Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.284 The
FBI Director spoke about an increase in mortgage fraud, the Inspector General
spoke about the need for increased funding to fight securities and financial fraud,
especially in light of the massive influx of taxpayer funds via TARP, and the
Acting Assistant General discussed the need for FERA to “provide key statutory
enhancements that will assist in ensuring that those who have committed fraud are
held accountable.”285 The Committee Report does not comment on the effective
date provision. The “Purpose” section frames FERA generally as a law
enforcement response to the financial crisis286 but reiterates the FCA amendments’

280. S. 2041, 110th Cong. § 9(a)–(c) (2007) (emphasis added).
281. Id.
282. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 1–2 (2009), as reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 430. The
following senators joined later as co-sponsors: Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Schumer (D-N.Y.),
Murray (D-Wash.), Bayh (D-Ind.), Specter (D-Pa.), Snowe (R-Me.), Harkin (D-Iowa), Levin
(D-Mich.), Dorgan (D-N.D.), Whitehouse (D-R.I.), Rockefeller (D-W.V.), Shaheen (DN.H.), Stabenow (D-Mich.), Sanders (I-Vt.), Bennet (D-Colo.), Durbin (D-Ill.), Mikulski (DMd.), Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Begich (D-Alaska), Burris (D-Ill.), Dodd (D-Conn.), Menendez
(D-N.J.), Cardin (D-Md.), Reid (D-Nev.), and Pryor (D-Ark.). See S. 155 CONG. REC.
S4735–36 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2009).
283. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 5.
284. Id. at 4–5.
285. Id. at 5.
286. Id. at 3 (“This bipartisan legislation will reinvigorate our Nation’s capacity to
investigate and prosecute the kinds of financial frauds that have so severely undermined our
financial markets and hurt so many hard working people in these difficult economic times.
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restorative purpose to overrule Allison Engine and Totten.287 Despite the large-bore
overhaul of the anti-fraud regime throughout the rest of FERA, the amending
language in section 4 of FERA (including subcontractor liability and a clarified
definition of claims) is very close to that contemplated by the Corrections Act,
discussed above.288
4. FERA Sponsor Statements
Unsurprisingly, individual senators emphasized different aspects of FERA at
different points in the legislative process. There are no smoking guns in the sponsor
statements. Nevertheless, several themes emerge. The first is the need for
accountability for the economic crisis. Senator Leahy, for example, emphasized the
criminal sanctions for mortgage fraud included in FERA.289 Senator Kaufman
focused on the need to “rescue, reform, and recapitalize our banking system.”290
The second theme is the restorative purpose of FERA’s FCA amendments, which
respond to “recent court decisions and changes in government-contracting practices
[that] have limited the effectiveness of the False Claims Act.”291 Statements by cosponsors affirm that section 4 of FERA was meant to reverse the presentment
decisions.292 They also show that the sponsors considered the FCA amendments
integral to a broad anti-fraud program necessitated by the present financial crisis.293
At the same time, the statements show that Congress considered the amendments to
be narrowly targeted and to not create any new penalties.294
This legislation provides the resources and new tools needed for law enforcement to uncover
and prosecute these frauds and to aggressively work to detect and prevent fraud related to the
Government’s ongoing efforts to bail out banks and stimulate the economy.”).
287. Id. at 10 (“[Section 4] amends the FCA to clarify and correct erroneous
interpretations of the law that were decided in [Allison Engine and Totten].”).
288. See supra Part VI.A.
289. See 155 CONG. REC. S4408–10 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(emphasizing law enforcement response to the fraud causing massive financial loss); see also
id. at S4414–15 (statement of Sen. Klobuchar) (emphasizing need for law enforcement
response to financial fraud); id. at S4420 (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (“There is a lot of work
to do in investigating and cracking down on financial fraud, including mortgage fraud. The
bill we are considering this week is going to go a long way toward that effort.”).
290. 155 CONG. REC. S3120 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kaufman)
(“Foremost, we must rescue, reform, and recapitalize our banking system. . . . [The cosponsors] and I pressed this legislation forward because we needed to ensure that the Justice
Department, the FBI, and other law enforcement agencies have the resources they need to
find, prosecute, and jail those who have committed financial fraud.”).
291. 155 CONG. REC. S4410 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2009).
292. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S1682 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(“The effectiveness of the False Claims Act has recently been undermined by court decisions
which limit the scope of the law and allow sub-contractors paid with government money to
escape responsibility for proven frauds. The False Claims Act must quickly be corrected and
clarified in order to protect from fraud the Federal assistance and relief funds expended in
response to our current economic crisis.”).
293. See id. at S1681–82 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
294. 155 CONG. REC. S4410 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“The
bill creates no new statutes and no new sentences. Instead, it focuses on modernizing
existing statutes to reach unregulated conduct and on addressing flawed court decisions
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Finally, Representative Berman, a key sponsor of the House version of FERA,
made a statement that supports retroactive application.295 Representative Berman
directly addressed the retroactivity of section 4(f)296 and then stated:
We intend for the definition of claim also to apply to all False Claims
Act claims pending on or after June 7, 2008, as that definition is an
intrinsic part of amended Section 3729(a)(1)(B). The purpose of this
amendment is to avoid the extensive litigation over whether the
amendments apply retroactively, as occurred following the 1986 False
Claims Act amendments.297
Representative Berman added that:
With the exception of conspiracy liability, the courts should rely on
these amendments to clarify the existing scope of False Claims Act
liability, even if the alleged violations occurred before the enactment of
these amendments.
In other words, the clarifying amendments in Section 4(a) do not
create a new cause of action where there was none before. Moreover,
these clarifications do not remove a potential defense or alter a
defendant’s potential exposure under the Act. In turn, courts should
consider and honor these clarifying amendments, for they correctly
describe the existing scope of False Claims Act liability under the
current and amended False Claims Act. The amended conspiracy
provision, on the other hand, is limited to those violations that occur
after the enactment of these amendments.298
These remarks are intended to close a potential loophole caused by the fact that
section 4(f) does not explicitly incorporate the newly revised definition of claims,
which resides in a different section.299 The context for this statement is Totten,
where plaintiff attempted to escape the presentment requirement by pointing to
FCA’s definition of claims, which even prior to FERA included requests “made to
a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government provides
any portion of the money”—a move the court rejected.300 Representative Berman is
interpreting those laws.”); see also id. at S4413 (statement of Sen. Kaufman) (stating that the
changes to FCA did not create “new paths to recover[] ill-gotten gains,” but instead were
“carefully considered” and “precisely targeted” to correct “ill-considered” court decisions).
295. 155 CONG. REC. E1300 (daily ed. June 3, 2009) (statement of Rep. Berman).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. (emphasis added).
299. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2) (West. Supp. 2010).
300. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 498–99 (2004) (“[T]he dissent points to
Section 3729(c), which, as we have seen, provides that the term ‘claim’ includes requests
made to grantees and other recipients ‘if the United States Government provides any portion
of the money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government will
reimburse [the recipient] for any portion of the money or property.’. . . This reading has a
fatal flaw: it yields exactly the same meaning that would result if Section 3729(a)(2) did not
contain the words ‘by the Government’ at all.” (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c)) (citations
omitted)).
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saying that both the newly “clarified” liability provisions and the new definitions of
claims apply retroactively. The reference to “removing a potential defense” and
“increasing liability” addresses the holding of Hughes Aircraft by making explicit
that the “clarifications” to FCA do not create new liability and thus do not have
“retroactive effect.”301
5. FERA’s Drafting History
There were several draft versions of FERA. The first was introduced into the
Senate on February 5, 2009.302 The original version of FERA did not include an
effective date provision. On March 5, a marked-up version was introduced
containing retroactivity language that is the same language that appears in section
4(f)(1) of FERA, but without the companion subsection (f)(2).303 On May 6, 2009,
the House304 amended FERA by adding section 4(f)(2), which applies certain
procedural amendments “to cases pending on the date of enactment.”305 This multitiered provision remained in the final version signed by President Obama on May
20, 2009.
6. Conclusion: Legislative History
We can draw several conclusions from legislative history. First, Congress
intended section 4 of FERA to overrule Totten and Allison Engine.306 Congress

301. See supra Part IV.
302. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 2 (2009), as reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 430.
303. Id. at 6, as reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 434; see also S. 386, 111th Cong. §
4(b) (reported in Senate Mar. 5, 2009).
304. The earliest House version of the FCA Corrections Act was introduced by
Representative Berman (joined by Representative James Sensenbrenner) to the House on
December 19, 2007. H.R. 4854, 110th Cong. (2007). The original bill includes an express
retroactivity provision that reads “[t]he amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the
date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any case pending on, or filed on or after,
that date.” Id. at § 8. Representative Berman explained that the law’s intent was to correct
judicial rulings where “courts have thrown out cases in which the Government has
administered Government programs, and expended its funds through contractors and other
agents, as opposed to direct expenditure.” 153 CONG. REC. E2658 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007)
(statement of Rep. Berman). To further that end, “[w]e intend for these amendments to apply
to all future cases as well as all cases that are pending in the courts on the date the
amendments become law.” Id. The 2009 version of the House Corrections Act is far more
detailed and has a multi-tiered effective date provision with default retroactivity (“shall
apply to any case pending on, or filed on or after, that date”), but now also has exceptions for
several procedural provisions that would operate prospectively. See H.R. 1788, 111th Cong.
§ 7 (2009).
305. S. 386, 111th Cong. § 4(f)(2) (engrossed House amendment, May 6, 2009).
306. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 11 (2009), as reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430,
438 (“The Totten decision, like the Allison Engine decision, runs contrary to the clear
language and congressional intent of the FCA by exempting subcontractors who knowingly
submit false claims to general contractors and are paid with Government funds.”); see also
id. (“Following the decision in Totten a number of courts have held that the FCA does not
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achieved this in part by revising the technical definition of claims to clarify that the
FCA was designed to capture all fraud against government funds, whether or not
the government has title to the money.307 The “original intent” argument has
additional force because Senator Grassley was both the original sponsor of the
1986 FCA amendments and an original co-sponsor of FERA.308 While a stated
intent to restore the original understanding of a statute does not dispose of the
retroactivity question, it nevertheless points toward applying the FCA amendments
to pending cases. Where Congress overrules a federal court’s erroneous
interpretation of a statute, the correct reading applies to pending cases. Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm established the principle that “[w]hen a new law makes clear that
it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law in reviewing judgments still
on appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted, and must alter the
outcome accordingly.”309 Moreover, “[i]t is the obligation of the last court in the
hierarchy that rules on the case to give effect to Congress’s latest enactment, even
when that has the effect of overturning the judgment of an inferior court, since each
court, at every level, must ‘decide according to existing laws.’”310 Under the Plaut
rule, Congress cannot reopen a final judgment lest it trigger a separation-of-powers
violation.311 A final judgment is one rendered by the United States Supreme Court
(or one in which the time for appeal has expired).312 Therefore, FERA cannot be
construed to reopen cases brought to final adjudication.

reach false claims that are (1) presented to Government grantees and contractors, and (2)
paid with Government grant or contract funds. These cases are representative of the types of
frauds the FCA was intended to reach when it was amended in 1986.” (footnote omitted)).
307. Id. at 13 (“[T]his bill includes a clarification to the definition of the term ‘claim’ in
new Section 3729(b)(2)(A) and attaches FCA liability to knowingly false requests or
demands for money and property from the U.S. Government, without regard to whether the
United States holds title to the funds under its administration.”).
308. 155 CONG. REC. S4412 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2009) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“I
think I have some expertise in that area, being the author of this legislation and finding the
Supreme Court’s ruling contrary to congressional intent, albeit their motivation may be to
interpret the law and that is the way they interpret it, but it does not keep us from going back
to what we think is the original intent and saying to the courts: You got it wrong.”).
309. 514 U.S. 211, 226 (1995); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273–
80 (1994); Lundeen v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 532 F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 2008) (applying
new corrective amendment to conduct preceding enactment where the statute applies “to all
pending State law causes of action arising from events or activities occurring on or after
January 18, 2002”); supra note 26.
310. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227 (quoting United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
103, 109 (1801)); see also Lundeen, 532 F.3d at 689 (“[T]he Supreme Court reiterated
Congress possesses the power to amend existing law even if the amendment affects the
outcome of pending cases.” (citing Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218)).
311. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227 (“Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the
law applicable to that very case was something other than what the courts said it was.”
(emphasis in original)); see also Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1139 (finding that there
is no separation of power challenge to an amendment to applicable law, which applies in
pending and future cases).
312. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227 (“Within that hierarchy, the decision of an inferior court is not
(unless the time for appeal has expired) the final word of the department as a whole.”).
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Second, legislative history reveals that Congress considered the retroactivity
issue. Early versions of section 4 of FERA include retroactivity language.313 The
Clarifications Act twice amended the effective date language to assuage the
concerns of the Department of Justice that unclear retroactivity language could lead
to a replay of the post-1986 FCA litigation.314 In the next version of section 4,
Congress tied the substantive amendments to the date of Allison Engine, making
these amendments retroactive. The floor statement made by Representative Berman
only confirms that Congress considered the retroactivity issue.315
Third, drafting history undermines the negative implication theory that several
courts have relied on to conclude that claims and cases must mean different
things.316 It is well established that negative implication works best where the
provisions at issue were drafted at the same time and cover the same subject
matter.317 As demonstrated above, sections 4(f)(1)–(2) were drafted in different
chambers of Congress at different times.318 Section 4(f)(1) began its life in the
March 5, 2009 Senate version of FERA.319 Section 4(f)(2) entered the mix through
an amendment made by the House and accepted by the Senate on May 5, 2009.320
If the provisions had been drafted together, it might have been possible to draw the
inference that they include different language because section 4(f)(1) implicates
substantive liability while section 4(f)(2) refers only to procedural provisions. As it
stands, however, because they were drafted at different times in different chambers
of Congress, the case for a negative inference regarding sections (f)(1) and (f)(2) is
accordingly weak.
B. Retroactive Effect Analysis
The imposition of FCA liability on subcontractors without a clear statement of
retroactive intent would have retroactive effect because it would impose increased
liability for past conduct. Under either definition of claims, subcontractors who
would not have been liable under the pre-FERA presentment rulings would now be
liable for treble damages under FCA. Prior to FERA, under the technical reading,
subcontractors who had claims pending between June 7, 2008 and May 20, 2009
would not have been subject to treble-damages FCA liability. They now would be

313. See supra note 278–80 and accompanying text.
314. See supra Part VI.A.3.b.
315. See supra Part VI.A.4.
316. See, e.g., Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 87, 107 (D.D.C. 2009); see
also supra Part VI.A.5.
317. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997) (“[N]egative implications raised by
disparate provisions are strongest when the portions of a statute treated differently had
already been joined together and were being considered simultaneously when the language
raising the implication was inserted.” (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75 (1995))); see
also Field, 516 U.S. at 75 (“The more apparently deliberate the contrast, the stronger the
inference, as applied, for example, to contrasting statutory sections originally enacted
simultaneously in relevant respects . . . .”).
318. See supra Part VI.A.5.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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subject to such liability. Even ordinary compensatory damages would affect the
liability of FCA subcontractor defendants in the same fashion as triggered
retroactivity concerns in Landgraf.321 As the Supreme Court stated in Landgraf,
“[t]he extent of a party’s liability, in the civil context as well as the criminal, is an
important legal consequence that cannot be ignored.”322
Moreover, under the cases theory, potential liability reaches back many years, as
the conduct underlying pending FCA cases may have occurred long ago.323 The
Aguillon court’s analysis was therefore correct in at least one respect: “If, in fact,
plaintiff were not required to prove actual payment or approval under the 2009
amendments to the FCA, application of the FCA amendments would cause
retroactive effects because it would increase defendant’s liability for past
conduct.”324 This is in line with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hughes Aircraft that
the 1986 FCA amendments retroactively subjected parties to qui tam litigation that
was foreclosed under prior law.325 A new statute that without expressly intending to
nevertheless imposes retroactive liability where there was no liability before can
fairly be said to operate in a fundamentally unfair way.326
CONCLUSION
It is an unfortunate irony that Congress chose the word claims to describe the
cases to which section 4(f)(1) of FERA applies. Using claims in a generic sense
where the statute also provides a narrower technical definition of that very term is
at best sloppy draftsmanship.327 This is doubly so because FERA is meant to
provide clarity and consistency in an unclear area of the law.328 The present
confusion could have been avoided had Congress written a phrase such as “cases
pending on June 7, 2008” or “conduct occurring prior to June 7, 2008.”
Nevertheless, as I have demonstrated above, all available evidence points towards
retroactivity, so courts should apply the new FCA subcontractor liability language
in cases that were pending on or after June 7, 2008. This is the result Congress
intended.

321. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 282 (1994) (“Compensatory damages
may be intended less to sanction wrongdoers than to make victims whole, but they do so by a
mechanism that affects the liabilities of defendants.” (emphasis in original)).
322. Id. at 283–84.
323. See supra Part I.
324. United States v. Aguillon, 628 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550 (D. Del. 2009).
325. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 950 (2009).
326. See id.; see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265; Basset, supra note 31, at 530 (“[T]he
Supreme Court’s decisions have . . . traditionally considered notions of fairness in reviewing
legislative retroactivity. These notions of fairness have included equity, justice, and
reliance.”).
327. This point was suggested to me by Professor Michael Rich. See E-mail from
Professor Michael Rich, Assistant Professor of Law, Capital University, to Matthew Titolo,
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University School of Law (Feb. 17, 2010,
16:21 EST) (on file with author).
328. See supra Part VI.A.3.a.
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One final point. The financial crisis has starkly revealed structural cracks in our
public policy consensus that privatized government and deregulation typically lead
to better outcomes.329 Longtime proponents of a law and economics approach, such
as Judge Richard Posner, have initiated a dialogue on the conceptual shortcomings
of laissez faire economics that have contributed to our current economic malaise.330
Similarly, legal scholars will continue to debate the merits of our nation’s heavy
reliance on private contractors to perform many functions traditionally performed
by government.331 Space does not permit me to address these larger issues here. In
future essays, however, I will join this debate by addressing the theoretical
underpinnings that have informed both the law and economics movement and the
dominant policy preference for privatized government.

329. See, e.g., supra notes 2–3; see also Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of
New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 61, 63 (2009) (“In the past year, the world has shown us the folly of some of legal
scholarship’s most powerful intellectual assumptions. The sudden collapse of our world
economy has led to economists’ open confessions that markets are not self-regulating and
that they can be skewed by systematic irrational behavior, [undermining] frequent
assumptions of neoclassical law and economics.”).
330. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 235 (2009) (“As far as one can judge on the basis of what is
known today . . . the depression is the result of normal business activity in a laissez-faire
economic regime—more precisely, it is an event consistent with the normal operation of
economic markets.”).
331. This debate is well underway. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minnow eds., 2009); see also
VERKUIL, supra note 2; Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1367 (2003); Minow, supra note 3.

